A New Look at the Original Meaning of the Diversity Clause by Moller, Mark
A NEW LOOK AT THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE
DIVERSITY CLAUSE
MARK MOLLER*
ABSTRACT
Must a federal court have obtained the power to bind a party
before her citizenship becomes relevant to diversity jurisdiction? For
a long time conventional wisdom has assumed the answer is “no”:
Congress can authorize diversity jurisdiction based on the citizenship
of persons who, although currently beyond the court’s power to bind,
might later join the suit. Congress, in turn, has acted on this
assumption. Key provisions of the most ambitious, and controversial,
expansion of diversity jurisdiction in the last decade, the 2005 Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA), hinge diversity jurisdiction on the
citizenship of persons conventionally believed beyond a court’s power
to bind—i.e., proposed class members in an uncertified class. Based
on an examination of the original semantic meaning of the Diversity
Clause, this Article argues that the conventional wisdom is wrong:
Diversity jurisdiction is limited to suits in which citizens of different
states are brought within a court’s power to bind their interests. In
the process, the Article sheds new light on the original meaning of an
Article III “controversy”—in particular, on whom an Article III
“controversy” subsists “between.” The Article ends by exploring the
ramifications of the Clause’s original meaning. First, recovering that
meaning reveals how Article III and due process norms combine to
protect states from jurisdictional encroachment by federal courts.
Second, the original meaning of the Clause provides a powerful
textual basis for involving Congress in important decisions about the
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outer reach of federal principles of nonparty preclusion. The Article
illustrates these points, and shows how they are related, by applying
the original meaning of the Diversity Clause to resolve questions
about the constitutionality of the Class Action Fairness Act. 
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INTRODUCTION
The Diversity Clause is the Walter Mitty of Article III’s jurisdic-
tional grants: staid and pedestrian, nothing new or interesting
seems possible to say about it. But like Walter Mitty, the Diversity
Clause has unplumbed depths. 
The hint that we don’t know the Diversity Clause as well as we
think we do lies in a jurisdictional puzzle raised by the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA),1 passed by Congress in 2005. CAFA’s principal
goal is to pull large multistate class actions filed in state court into
federal court, where its proponents hope that federal judges—
thanks to their independence from the fundraising pressures of
state electoral politics and, perhaps, to Republican success in filling
out the ranks of the federal judiciary—will take a sterner hand with
the class action bar than their state counterparts.
To achieve that goal, CAFA jettisons the complete diversity rule,
allowing federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over multistate
class actions if a class action exhibits minimum diversity.2 Notably,
CAFA allows federal courts to consider the citizenship of absent
class members before a class has been certified when determining
whether minimum diversity exists.3 As a result, plaintiffs’ lawyers
cannot park a multistate class action in state court simply by
recruiting a nondiverse named plaintiff to sue the defendant. So
long as the plaintiff proposes to represent a class that allegedly
includes members who live outside the defendant’s domicile, the
class action is removable at the time it is filed.
Brian Wolfman, Public Citizen’s litigation director, pointed out
the puzzle raised by CAFA in 1999 testimony to the House Judiciary
Committee on an early iteration of CAFA. “When a proposed class
action is filed,” he said,
1. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. See Class Action Fairness Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006). CAFA assumes
that the “complete diversity” requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 267
(1806), is statutory rather than constitutional, H.R. REP. NO. 108-144, at 10 n.11 (2003), an
assumption I accept in this Article.
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
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the class does not yet exist and a constitutional “controversy”
exists only between the named plaintiffs and the defendant....
Put another way, there is no controversy between the absent
class members ... and the defendant, and thus it is difficult to
imagine how diversity jurisdiction can be constitutionally
maintained [based on class members’ citizenship] prior to
certification of the class.4
As Wolfman suggests, by treating absent members of a proposed
class—persons conventionally seen as outside the scope of the suit
at the time it is filed—as persons whose citizenship counts toward
diversity jurisdiction, CAFA forces us to ask who an Article III
“controversy” is “between” for purposes of establishing diversity
jurisdiction. 
Surprisingly, this elementary question about the meaning of the
Diversity Clause hasn’t been answered.5 Answering it—the task of
this Article—uncovers something new about the scope of diversity
jurisdiction: Diversity jurisdiction is limited to suits in which
citizens of different states are within the court’s power to bind their
4. Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999 and Workplace Goods Job Growth and
Competitiveness Act of 1999: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 64
(1999) (statement of Brian Wolfman). Wolfman suggested that Article III limits the minimum
diversity inquiry to the citizenship of the litigant “parties” before the court. Because, he said,
proposed class members in an uncertified class are not “parties,” their citizenship does not
count in the minimum diversity calculus. See id. (“Assume a situation in which the named
plaintiff and all the named defendants are citizens of state ‘X.’ 50% of the proposed class
members are also citizens of state ‘X,’ but 50% of the proposed class members are citizens of
states ‘Y’ or ‘Z’ .... [I]n the hypothetical, prior to class certification, all of the parties are from
the same state–X ... and thus it is difficult to imagine how diversity jurisdiction can be
constitutionally maintained in this circumstance prior to certification of the class.”). This
Article explores the extent to which the original meaning of the phrase “controversies between
citizens of different states” supports Wolfman’s claims. 
5. Obviously, the scope of a constitutional case or controversy has received a great deal
of attention in the context of federal supplemental jurisdiction, where the Court, of course,
defines a “constitutional case” as a grouping of transactionally related claims. United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). But see Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering “One
Constitutional Case”: Procedural Rules and Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental
Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1399 (1983) (arguing that a constitutional case comprises
whatever grouping of claims Congress authorizes parties to join as a litigative unit). Federal
jurisdiction doctrine has, however, overlooked a very basic question about the scope of a
constitutional case or controversy: namely, whose claims are “before the court” and therefore
part of the jurisdictional calculus when deciding when original jurisdiction exists based on the
“character of the parties”? That question has never been answered and, indeed, is rarely ever
asked. 
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interests.6 In other words, contrary to received wisdom, the consti-
tutional reach of diversity jurisdiction and the constitutional scope
of federal courts’ power to issue preclusive judgments are linked. 
The argument rests on the original meaning of an Article III
controversy. As I show, an Article III controversy is a “suit,” and
“suits” were defined in the eighteenth century to exist only “be-
tween” the “parties to the suit,” persons who had been brought
“before” the court in a way that allowed it to bind their rights.
Because an Article III “controversy” subsists between persons who
can be bound by federal judgments, those persons’ citizenship—but
no others—may be considered in the diversity jurisdiction calculus. 
Showing that Article III’s most familiar clause is also its most
misunderstood takes some work. The argument builds over five
parts. Parts I and II take some time to do some necessary ground-
clearing. Because the argument is based on new evidence about the
original meaning of an Article III “controversy,” Part I begins with
a short overview of “original meaning” originalism, a frequently
misunderstood interpretive method. 
6. In this Article, I use the terms “preclusive power,” “preclusive reach” of federal courts,
and “federal courts’ power to bind” as shorthand for satisfaction of adequate notice and other
procedural due process protections required to bind litigants’ interests. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2166 (2008). I do not use “power to bind” to mean the court’s “power
in light of all relevant constitutional restraints,” because a federal court’s power to bind in
this sense depends on whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb,
305 U.S. 165 (1938) (stating that the binding effect of former adjudication presumes court had
subject matter jurisdiction over the litigation). 
“Personal jurisdiction” is also used as a loose synonym for the “power to bind.” See, e.g.,
Ariel Waldman, Allocating the Burden of Proof in Rule 60(b)(4) Motions To Vacate a Default
Judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 522 (2001). I avoid using the term
in that sense here, due to confusion about the relationship between personal jurisdiction and
the power to bind absent class members and other persons in relationships of privity with
named parties. See infra notes 261-73 and accompanying text (discussing the debate over
whether the opt out requirement in damages class actions should be treated as a due process
requirement for exercise of personal jurisdiction over class members or as a separate free-
standing due process restraint on courts’ power to bind class members); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 41f (1982) (noting that jurisdiction over absentees is
not a prerequisite for binding absentees represented by named parties; the power to bind such
absentees turns on analytically separate requirements for establishing a relationship of
privity through representation). To avoid confusion, I use “personal jurisdiction” in a narrow
sense, to refer to the due process principles defining the extraterritorial reach of compulsory
process, while using the term “preclusive power” or “power to bind” to refer to courts’ power
to issue binding, preclusive judgments as a general matter.
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To forestall initial resistance to the argument based on its
apparent novelty, Part II shows that the interpretation advanced
herein isn’t novel. It was advanced soon after the Constitution’s
ratification, only to be discarded by later courts and forgotten by
commentators.
The Article then delves into the key evidence of the Clause’s
meaning, drawn from preratification sources. I develop this argu-
ment in two parts. Part III shows that one of the conventional
meanings of “controversies” was “suits” and that “suits” in the
eighteenth century were defined to exist only between those within
a court’s power to bind. Part IV then shows that the text of Article
III requires us to interpret “controversies” to mean suits and
excludes broader interpretations of the term. 
With the hidden dimensions of the Diversity Clause revealed,
Part V ends by exploring two larger ramifications of the Clause’s
original meaning. First, recovering its original meaning reveals how
Article III and the standards governing nonparty preclusion
combine to protect states from jurisdictional encroachment by
federal courts. Second, the original meaning of the Clause also
provides a powerful textual basis for involving Congress in impor-
tant decisions about the outer reach of federal preclusion. I illus-
trate both of these points, and show how they are related, by
applying the original meaning of the Diversity Clause to resolve
questions about the constitutionality of CAFA. 
I. THE METHOD EXPLAINED
Led by Justice Scalia, a new generation of originalists has
rejected a search for the Framers’ intentions and reframed orig-
inalism as a search for the meaning that reasonable readers of
English within the Framers’ linguistic community would assign to
the Constitution’s words.7 Below, I follow this general approach,
7. For various descriptions of this approach, see, for example, Randy Barnett, An
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum,
Semantic Originalism (Illinois Public Law Research Paper 07-24, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.
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which its practitioners call “original meaning” originalism or
“semantic originalism.”8
The distinction between older “original intent” originalism and
modern “original meaning” originalism is often misunderstood.
Accordingly, before diving into the evidence of the Diversity Clause’s
original meaning, a quick overview of the method pursued is
necessary both to clarify the hierarchy of evidence of original
meaning on which I rely and to define some originalist terminol-
ogy—particularly the distinction between “interpretation” and
“construction”—that will be used later in the argument.
A. Evidence of Original Meaning
Original meaning originalists agree on a hierarchy of source
material. At the top of the pyramid are publicly available examples
of the conventional meaning ascribed to words by members of the
Framers’ linguistic community, including dictionaries, treatises, and
(especially when words were used in a technical legal sense) cases.9
“Almost all originalists agree, explicitly or implicitly, that the
meaning ... of a given Constitutional provision was fixed at the time
the provision was framed and ratified.”10 As a result, postenactment
evidence of usage, which may reflect changes in meaning after
ratification, “ranks fairly low down on the hierarchy of reliable
evidence concerning original meaning.”11
8. This Article accepts this method without spending time defending any particular
normative justification for originalism. As a practical matter, the specific reasons one comes
to originalism shape its application only in a subset of special interpretive problems, where
the evidence of conventional meaning fails to identify a unique interpretive solution—a point
explained more fully below. Outside this subset, however, conventional “original meaning”
originalists, despite diverging at the level of theory, have converged around a shared family
of interpretive methods. When, as in this Article, these methods can supply interpretive
solutions to a constitutional question, deep intramural debates about the normative
foundations of originalism are, at least for originalism’s adherents, a distraction. For our
purposes, it is enough to note that all of the various originalist camps share a basic formalist
commitment to treating the Constitution as a set of instructions that entrenches meaning
against future generations.
9. See, e.g., Stephen G. Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President’s Power To
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 552 n.35 (1994). 
10. Solum, supra note 7, at 2.
11. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002).
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Where the Constitution’s words were conventionally used in more
than one way prior to ratification, the Constitution’s meaning isn’t
necessarily ambiguous. Originalists agree that holistic interpreta-
tion of the text, taking account of intratextual inferences from
surrounding words and clauses, may disambiguate the text when
one of two conventional meanings of a term is (1) inconsistent with
the necessary implications of words immediately surrounding it, or
(2) inconsistent with parallel use of the term in surrounding
clauses.12
The “general point or purpose” of a text may also clarify the sense
in which a word is used when the general reader would have relied
on that purpose to make sense of the text.13 It does not matter that
“bank” means “financial institution” as well as “river bank” if the
word appears in a river navigation chart. When a word’s conven-
tional meaning differs depending on context, ascertaining its
meaning requires conventional judgments in light of contextual
information that ordinary interpreters would treat as determina-
tive.
Because “no tool of interpretation is a magic bullet,”14 the
meaning of a word extracted from dictionaries, intratextual
interpolation, and publicly available context must “be checked
against readings generated by other lenses.”15 Those lenses, in order
of probative value, include: (1) publicly available preratification
interpretations that “reveal something about the ... meaning [of] the
[Constitution’s] text” by “those who had the recognized political
authority to ratify it into law,”16 and (2) the secret records of the
Constitutional Convention, when they “display[ ] how the text of the
Constitution was originally understood and used” by the Framers’
interpretive community.17
12. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 748, 795 (1999); see also Solum,
supra note 7, at 105 (“[C]lause meaning is bound by the publicly available context, and the
whole of the constitutional text is indisputably part of that.”).
13. Solum, supra note 7, at 53.
14. Amar, supra note 12, at 801.
15. Id.
16. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 553.
17. Vesan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1118 (2003); see also Akhil Amar, The Supreme
Court 1999 Term: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 47 n.65 (2000)
(“Details of legislative history invisible to ratifiers and later generations of ordinary
Americans should never trump the text itself, though drafting history can at times help
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Finally, originalists of various normative stripes agree that
constitutional meaning is the “more likely correct” meaning, based
on all of the above evidence.18 Alternative burdens—proof beyond a
reasonable doubt or “clear statements”—would guarantee that the
Constitution, in most major cases, cannot fulfill its settlement
function.19
B. A Note on Interpretation and Construction
The new originalism distinguishes what Keith Whittington calls
acts of “constitutional construction” from acts of “interpretation.”20
Interpretation uncovers the range of meanings that a word consid-
ered in context might bear. Construction selects one of several
available meanings as the operative meaning of a constitutional
word or phrase, or when the meaning is vague, formulates rules for
applying the text to everyday problems of litigation.21
Within the field in which construction takes over from interpreta-
tion, the normative values that lead an interpreter to originalism
come to the fore. As Randy Barnett explains, “So long as we stay
within the frame provided by the original meaning of the text, our
choice of specific rules to decide cases may be influenced by other
considerations, such as justice or precedent, depending on what it
is we think makes a constitution binding.”22
Because construction is dependent on different normative com-
mitments, constructions of different clauses of the Constitution may
vary widely among different self-described originalists.23 However,
for purposes of this Article, those normative commitments are
largely irrelevant. My analysis of the meaning of the Diversity
highlight certain features of the text.”).
18. Barnett, supra note 7, at 649 (citing Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original
Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV.
226, 244 (1988)).
19. Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
411, 417-21 (1995) (making this point, while noting the risk that lowering the standard of
proof too low may blind us to genuine indeterminacy).
20. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 3-5 (1999).
21. Id. at 3-9; Solum, supra note 7, at 67.
22. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
101, 111 (2001).
23. Id.
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Clause operates at the level of interpretation rather than construc-
tion: it seeks to establish the outer limits of the Clause’s original
meaning.24
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ORIGINAL DIVERSITY CLAUSE
Even though preratification evidence of meaning of the
Constitution’s text is primary,25 I begin by reviewing postenactment
interpretations of the Diversity Clause.
This is necessary to dispel a mistaken basis for initial resistance
to my argument. Novel readings of a constitutional text arouse
natural skepticism.26 And this Article advances a reading of the
Diversity Clause that will strike many as novel: I argue that
diversity jurisdiction exists only where “parties” to a federal suit,
defined as persons whom courts are authorized to bind, are citizens
of different states. This interpretation turns on evidence of the
original meaning of the term “controversy,” which I will show means
“suits,” and on the original meaning of the term “suit,” which I will
show was defined to subsist only “between” persons who were
subject to the court’s preclusive power. Put simply, “controversies
between citizens of different states” are “suits between persons
whose interests the court is authorized to bind.”27
24. At a key juncture, I make two moves that are pervasive in originalist scholarship: (1)
using the canon that careful word-choices should be given distinct legal effect, and (2) an
ascription to the Framers of a general purpose to communicate intelligibly. See, e.g., John F.
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 76 (2006)
(noting that textualists pervasively rely on these moves to resolve semantic ambiguity). It is
not clear that all originalists would categorize both of these moves as acts of interpretation,
although most would classify the latter as an “interpretive” move, at least in some contexts.
Compare Solum, supra note 7, at 78-79 (categorizing use of traditional interpretive rules as
a “theory of construction”), with id. at 56 (suggesting semantic “opacity” may favor construing
words as terms of art, when doing so renders text intelligible). Even so, my claim is that
because these moves are so widely accepted among originalists, originalists with different
normative commitments are likely to agree that these moves are part of the toolkit for
defining the outer acceptable meaning of the text even if we assume these moves constitute
acts of “construction.” 
25. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The First “Establishment” Clause: Article VII
and the Post-Constitutional Confederation, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 83, 92 (2002) (“If no actual
person held a mental state corresponding to a particular meaning Z, it gets trickier to
determine whether Z could ever be the correct meaning.”).
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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This claim about the meaning of Article III “controversies” is not
new. It was advanced, postratification, by John Marshall as a
member of Congress, opposed by Alexander Hamilton, and adopted,
in part, in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,28 only to be dis-
carded by later courts and forgotten by commentators. This Part
briefly recounts that history. Parts III and IV then show that
Marshall’s view is strongly supported by the preratification evidence
of Article III’s original meaning.
A. The Marshall-Hamilton Debate over the Meaning of         
Controversies Between Citizens of Different States
Article III’s jurisdictional menu grants federal courts subject
matter jurisdiction over an enumerated set of cases and controver-
sies. Some of these turn on the nature of the questions litigated—for
example, “[c]ases ... arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and Treaties made ... under their Authority”—while
others turn on the configuration of persons “between” whom a
controversy subsists—for example, “[c]ontroversies ... between
Citizens of different States” or “between ... States.”29 In the wake of
the Constitution’s ratification, a debate arose about how to construe
the latter Heads of Jurisdiction. Alexander Hamilton suggested they
turn on the identity of persons “interested” in the underlying
dispute out of which the suit arose, even if those persons were not
capable of being bound by judgments in the suit. Marshall, by
contrast, argued they turn on the “character of the litigant parties”
in the filed suit—that is the persons who could be bound by the
court’s judgments.
The debate was joined in Fowler v. Lindsay,30 a case involving a
dispute to land claimed under grants from Connecticut and New
York. After the Connecticut grantees instituted an ejectment action
in Connecticut’s district court, the defendants, fearing a biased jury
had been impaneled, removed the case to the Supreme Court,
invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction over “controversies
between states.”31
28. 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
30. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411, 411 (1799). 
31. See Julius Goebel, Jr., The Connecticut Gore Controversy, in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 663-71 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964) [hereinafter 1 HAMILTON].
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As neither Connecticut nor New York were actually litigants in
the suit, the defendants’ theory of original jurisdiction may seem
odd. The theory, however, had been laid out by Alexander Hamilton,
the counsel for the New York defendants. In response to the natural
objection that the Supreme Court lacked original jurisdiction
because no state was, in fact, a party to the controversy, he argued
that Connecticut and New York were interested in the underlying
dispute, which concerned which state could properly lay claim to the
territory at issue. To construe jurisdiction to depend on whether a
state is a “party to the suit, that is Plff. or Deft.,” he said, “would
derogate from the end and view of the Constitution”—to preserve
the “public tranquillity.”32 Rather, he contended, both the Judiciary
Act and Article III permit the Supreme Court to exercise original
jurisdiction whenever a state is “a party in interest” to the larger
dispute, not simply when the state “is a suitor, Plff. or Deft.”33
Hamilton’s argument did not carry the day in Fowler. Justice
Washington’s opinion for the Court and Justice Cushing’s concur-
rence held that “cases” and “controversies” enumerated in Article III
are “suits,” not disputes, and that the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction over controversies between different states therefore
turns on whether states are “parties[ ] to the suits.”34 The states, the
Court held, did not qualify.35
Beyond venturing that states’ interests in the underlying dispute
did not qualify them as jurisdictional parties, Fowler did not define
“parties to the suit.” A year later, as a member of Congress, then-
Rep. John Marshall offered one definition: a party to an Article III
“controversy,” or suit, he said, is someone who “come[s] into court,
who can be reached by its process, and bound by its power.”36
As we will see, that’s the right reading of Article III. Hamilton’s
interpretation, by contrast, is a specious, if clever, piece of advocacy.
Unfortunately, Marshall’s interpretation never took hold—and he
is largely to blame. As Chief Justice, he took a slightly different
32. Fowler v. Lindsay, Minutes of the Circuit Court, District of Connecticut, April Term,
1798, in 1 HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 682.
33. Id.
34. Fowler, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 412; id. at 414 (Cushing, J., concurring). 
35. Id. at 412 (majority opinion).
36. John Marshall, Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives of the United
States, on the Resolutions of the Hon. Edward Livingston, Relative to Thomas Nash, Alias
Jonathan Robbins (1800), reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82, 95-96 (Charles
T. Cullen ed., 1984) [hereinafter 4 MARSHALL]. 
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view of the identity of a “party” to an Article III case or controversy
in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, a case involving a suit by
the Bank of the United States against the Treasurer of Ohio.37
Marshall’s narrow construction helped him reach a politically
desirable outcome, but proved unworkable in the long run.
B. Marshall’s Pyrrhic Victory 
Osborn asked the Court to resolve a dispute about the scope of
state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, which bars federal
jurisdiction over suits brought by citizens of one state against
another state.38 The National Bank had filed suit to recover taxes
unconstitutionally levied against it by Ohio’s treasurer.39 Although
Ohio’s attempt to tax the Bank violated Marshall’s ruling in
McCulloch v. Maryland that the Bank was immune from state
taxation,40 the State hoped to evade McCulloch by invoking its own
immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.41 The Bank,
in turn, anticipated that problem and named the state treasurer,
Osborn, as a party-defendant, but not the State itself.42
Osborn argued that the suit was really against Ohio, not Osborn,
because Ohio was substantially interested in the outcome—if
Osborn lost, after all, the State would lose tax revenue.43 Marshall
responded by drawing a parallel between the Eleventh Amendment
and Article III.44 Article III’s controversy-denominated Heads of
Jurisdiction, he said, turn on the “character of the parties” to the
suit.45 Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment turns on whether
the State is a party to a suit.46 The Eleventh Amendment and
Article III, he argued, should be interpreted in pari materia.47
But, at this juncture, Marshall turned away from his earlier claim
that a “party” to a controversy, or “suit,” is someone who can be
37. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824).
38. Id. at 829.
39. Id. at 739-40.
40. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 390-91 (1819).
41. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 829.
42. Id. at 739-40.
43. Id. at 754-55.
44. Id. at 850-58.
45. Id. at 856-57.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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“bound” by a federal court’s judgments. Instead, he said, a party to
a suit is the person named as such “on the record,” that is, the
persons specifically identified by name as plaintiff or defendant in
the bill of complaint.48 Because Eleventh Amendment immunity
attaches when a state is a party, and Ohio was not named as a party
on the record, he concluded, the Eleventh Amendment was no bar
to the Bank’s suit.49
As we will see, that definition of “party to the suit” was narrow
relative to the range of meaning given the term in contemporaneous
cases.50 But Marshall’s narrow construction had its purposes: it
supplied an easy to state and easy to apply rule that provided the
National Bank with a roadmap to evade the reach of the Eleventh
Amendment in subsequent cases.
After Osborn, courts interchangeably cited the Eleventh
Amendment and diversity precedents on party status throughout
much of the first half of the nineteenth century.51 Yet, applied to
define diversity jurisdiction, the “party on the record” rule was too
inflexible, as canny states recognized. To defeat diversity jurisdic-
tion over suits between diverse citizens, for example, some states
required litigants to sue and defend in the name of local in-state
officials in certain cases.52 Taken literally, the record rule would
deny diversity jurisdiction in such a case, even if the actual litigants
who controlled the suit were citizens of different states. 
In these cases, the Court developed exceptions to the “party-on-
the-record” rule in order to justify jurisdiction.53 But by the end of
48. Id. at 857. 
49. Id. at 858.
50. See infra notes 74-128 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 9, 25 (1844) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (citing
Osborn in a diversity case).
52. In Mississippi, for example, when out-of-state judgment creditors sought to execute
a judgment against an in-state resident, state law required the sheriff to provide a bond to the
governor that he would execute process against the in-state resident and then required the
out-of-state judgment creditors to sue the resident under the bond using the governor’s name.
See id. at 13-15 (majority opinion).
53. For example, the Court variously suggested that the party of record rule did not apply
when named parties explicitly sue “for the use of” others, id. at 15; when the named parties
were “conduits” for the active litigants, Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 172, 177
(1870); Irvine v. Lowry, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 293, 300 (1840); when the “real part[ies] in interest”
possessed the legal right to control the suit, McNutt, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 15; when the “real
and only controversy” subsisted by unnamed parties, id.; or when the parties not named in
the record had an exclusive interest in the “object” of the suit, id. at 14. And, to justify these
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the nineteenth century, the Court’s attempts to preserve some
semblance of the “party-on-the-record” rule and explain these
exceptions raised more questions than they answered about the
rule’s source, scope, and viability.54
Frustrated by what appeared, by the end of the nineteenth
century, to be a body of law mired in murky formalism, subject
matter jurisdiction doctrine would abandon the concept of the “party
to the suit” as a jurisdictional limit and cast elsewhere to explain
the outer limits of Article III’s party-centered Heads of Jurisdiction. 
C. Hamilton’s Revenge: The Modern “Transactional”            
Definition of a Controversy
How modern jurisdictional doctrine defines those outer limits
remains, however, unclear. Modern commentators have exclusively
analyzed questions about the outer scope of the Diversity Clause by
referring to the transactional concept of a “constitutional case or
controversy” developed in the Court’s twentieth-century supplemen-
tal jurisdiction cases. 
The debate over the Class Action Fairness Act reflects this
approach.55 CAFA authorizes federal courts to exercise jurisdiction
over multistate class actions so long as some putative absent class
members and defendants are citizens of different states, even if the
named plaintiffs and defendants are not diverse.56 Because class
actions involve claims that share common questions of law and fact,
CAFA authorizes jurisdiction when at least some class members
have claims arising out of the same transaction that gives rise to the
exceptions to the “on-the-record” rule, it insinuated that the rule was a mere statutory
restraint on diversity jurisdiction, despite Osborn’s assumption otherwise. See, e.g.,
Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 174.
54. Ironically, the Court’s expansion of diversity jurisdiction occurred in suits where the
persons of diverse citizenship not named in the case caption would be bound by a final
judgment. Preclusion, of course, attaches to those who control the litigation for their benefit,
not just the persons who formally enter an appearance—a principle admitted in the
nineteenth century as well as our own. See, e.g., Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1, 18-19
(1865). Thus, the Supreme Court applied the party concept in a way consistent with then Rep.
Marshall’s claim in 1800 that “parties to the suit” were persons within courts’ preclusive
power. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
55. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
56. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the
Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2037 & n.4 (2008).
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plaintiff ’s suit and are diverse from the defendant.57 And it is on
this point that the debate about the constitutionality of CAFA has
been joined58: some question whether the claims of class members
and the named plaintiff in a typical Rule 23(b)(3)59 class are
sufficiently related to an underlying “transaction” to justify
supplemental jurisdiction over the named plaintiff based on the
citizenship of diverse absent class members.60
What’s startling, though, from the vantage of the Marshall-
Hamilton debate, is that both sides of the debate over CAFA assume
that the citizenship of diverse absent class members is jurisdiction-
ally relevant, despite the fact that the procedures necessary to bring
their claims within the scope of a court’s preclusive power haven’t
been completed.61 CAFA is seen as boundary pushing because it
allows the court to exercise jurisdiction over a grouping of abstract
claims that are questionably related to an ideal “transaction or
occurrence,” not because it hinges the court’s original jurisdiction on
the citizenship of persons who are beyond the court’s power to
bind.62 In effect, modern jurisdictional analysis acts as if an Article
III “controversy” is simply a grouping of actual and hypothetical
claims arising out of a prelitigative transaction or occurrence.63
57. Id.
58. James E. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, Aggregate Litigation, and the Limits of
Article III, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (2007) [hereinafter Pfander, Limits]; Wolff, supra note
56, at 2066.
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
60. Wolff, supra note 56, at 2067 & n.84 (describing this argument). 
61. To certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must assess whether the class claims
share sufficient commonality of facts and legal questions, whether common facts predominate,
whether the named plaintiff’s claim is typical of the class claims, whether the named plaintiff
is an adequate representative, whether the claims are manageable as a class, and whether
a class action is superior to other mechanisms for adjudicating the claims. See FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a), (b)(3). Even if the class satisfies these requirements, class members must be given
notice of the action and an opportunity to opt out of the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
62. This is not to say that debate over CAFA reflects a complete conceptual break between
modern subject matter jurisdiction doctrine and the law of former adjudication. Nobody takes
the position that a hypothetical class member’s citizenship could ground minimum diversity
if it were impossible for that person to join the suit as a party prior to a final judgment—no
matter how “transactionally” related his claims might be to a named plaintiff’s. And, perhaps,
some—if pushed—might take the position that the citizenship of class members who lack
minimum contacts with the United States, and therefore are not amenable to process, does
not count either. 
63. CAFA is also consistent with treating an Article III “controversy” as a suit, if parties
to the suit include those who have been granted expanded intervention opportunities. As we
will see, if “controversy” means suit, the original meaning of “suit” excludes subject matter
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This reflexive transactional approach to defining diversity’s outer
boundaries should sound familiar: in Fowler v. Lindsay, Hamilton
suggested that at its broadest, jurisdiction under the party-centered
Heads of Jurisdiction turns on the status of persons who are
materially interested in the larger “controversy,” or prelitigative
legal “dispute,” that gives rise to the suit filed in federal court.64 By
assuming that diversity jurisdiction, in its most expansive permissi-
ble form, turns on the citizenship of adverse persons involved in a
prelitigative “transaction” that precipitates the suit, regardless of
whether those persons are “before the court” in a preclusive sense,
the modern transactional approach to defining the outer scope of
diversity jurisdiction is hard to distinguish, as a functional matter,
from Hamilton’s. 
III. THE TWO CONVENTIONAL EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY MEANINGS OF
“CONTROVERSY”
In the last Part, we encountered two postratification interpreta-
tions of the term “controversies,” with different implications for the
meaning of the Diversity Clause. The Hamiltonian interpretation
assumes an Article III controversy is broad enough to encompass
the prelitigative “dispute” out of which a suit arises. On that view,
Article III flexibly extends diversity jurisdiction based on the
citizenship of parties to that dispute. 
The second view, advanced by then-Rep. Marshall, is that an
Article III “controversy” is a suit that subsists only “between”
persons who may be bound by a court’s judgments. On that view,
Article III narrowly extends diversity jurisdiction based on the
citizenship of those brought within a federal court’s preclusive
power.
Neither sense of the word is a facially implausible candidate for
the meaning of an Article III “controversy.” True, the advisory
opinion rule forbids federal courts from “deciding legal questions
outside of a litigated ‘case’ or ‘controversy,’” i.e., “a proper lawsuit
involving proper parties.”65 And consistent with that rule, most
jurisdiction based on this theory as well. 
64. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
65. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What
the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 302-03 (1994) (describing the advisory opinion doctrine this
way). 
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interpreters assume Article III uses the term “controversy” to mean
“suit.”66 But Hamilton’s alternative reading is not inconsistent with
the advisory opinion rule either. If Article III uses “controversy” in
a flexible way that encompasses both prelitigative disputes and
suits, courts could construe “controversies” to mean disputes for
purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, while confining
courts to deciding questions presented in the litigated portion of the
dispute.67
Who is right: Hamilton or Marshall? Determining the original
meaning of “controversies” requires two steps: (1) determining the
conventional preratification meaning of the word; and (2) if the
conventional meaning is ambiguous, resolving the ambiguity, if we
can, through intratextual analysis of Article III.68 Below I break this
analysis into two parts. 
In this Part, I consider the conventional preratification meaning
of the word “controversy.” The evidence shows that Hamilton’s and
Marshall’s interpretations reflect the two different conventional
eighteenth-century uses of the word. In Part IV, I then consider
which meaning fits the text of Article III.69
A. “Suits”
In the eighteenth century, the term “controversy” was convention-
ally used both (1) to refer to disputes that preceded the filing of a
lawsuit, as in “controversies” “in which no action is depending”;70
66. See, e.g., WALTER DELLINGER, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT:CURBING UNFAIRNESS
AND RESTORING FAITH IN OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM 4 (2003), available at http://www.ppionline.
orgppi_ci.cfm?KnlgAreaID=125&subseeID=900051&contentID=251379 (noting that the
Diversity Clause extends jurisdiction to “suits ‘between citizens of different states’”).
67. For evidence of the range of meaning given to the term “controversy” at the time of
ratification, see infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
69. Splitting the original meaning inquiry into two parts is necessary because the two
meanings of “controversy,” suit and dispute, reflect two different terms of art in eighteenth-
century jurisdictional law, and each is associated with a body of nuanced jurisdictional
terminology. Some of that terminology is used in Article III in a way that sheds light on the
meaning of an Article III “controversy.” By thoroughly exploring both senses of the term
before turning to the text, we will be in the best position to make sense of the Diversity Clause
in light of surrounding words and phrases.
70. For examples of the use of “controversy” in this way, see WILLIAM BOHUN, CURSUS
CANCELLARIE; OR, THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 506-13 (2d
ed. 1723) (discussing “the Controversy between my Lord Coke and Chancellor Egerton,” which
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and (2) more narrowly to refer to various kinds of duly instituted
“suit[s] in law,” including originally filed suits and appeals.71
I start in this Section by examining the preratification meaning
of a “suit.” As I show, a “suit” subsisted only between “parties to the
suit”; “parties to the suit” were persons who, as then-Rep. Marshall
put it, “come into court [and] can be ... bound by its power.”72
1. “Parties to the Suit” 
To unpack the meaning of a “suit” and its relationship to parties,
it helps to start with the definition of “parties to the suit.” In the
eighteenth century, English royal courts and their American
colonial counterparts adhered to the rule that in personal actions,
the “rights of no man [could] be decided in a court of justice, unless
he himself be present”73—a rule whose origins lay in the ancient
precursors of the royal court system. In the early medieval period,
proto-lawsuits were oral appeals for redress made in person, either
to the king, his judges, or local communal courts.74 The term “party,”
in turn, grew out of this system as a term that described the
litigants who physically appeared to orally present claims and
in context refers to a dispute concerning the jurisdiction of the court of chancery, standing
above a variety of legal proceedings related to the dispute). 
71. For examples of the use of “controversy” in this sense, see 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (8th ed. 1792) (defining controversy as “a suit in
law”); see also Jenifer v. Lord Proprietary, 1 H. & McH. 535, 539 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1774)
(referring interchangeably to modes of appeal in “civil suits” and “civil controvers[ies]”); Hite
v. Fairfax, 8 Va. (4 Call.) 42, 72 (1786) (referring to the “pendency of controversies in court”);
infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (collecting examples of preratification colonial
statutes that use “controversy” to mean “suit”).
72. 4 MARSHALL, supra note 36, at 95-96. 
73. FREDERIC CALVERT, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW RESPECTING PARTIES TO SUITS IN
EQUITY (1837), reprinted in THE LAW LIBRARY 1 (Thomas I. Wharton ed., 1837); see also 2
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 594-95 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND] (“Our law
would not give judgment against one who had not appeared.”). 
74. See, e.g., 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 73, at 602-04 (describing the system of
oral pleading in the Grand Assize of Henry II); JAMES STEPHEN & FRANCIS P. PINDER, A
TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS: COMPRISING A SUMMARY
ACCOUNT OF THE WHOLE PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT AT LAW 23 (6th ed. 1860) (describing early
medieval precursors of system of written pleadings).
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defenses,75 thereby submitting themselves to the court’s power to
resolve their dispute.76
After written pleading replaced oral pleading, the formalist
English common law system, wedded to continuing the ancient
forms of legal procedure after they had outlived their correspon-
dence to reality, continued to insist that physical presence “in court”
was a touchstone for judicial power to bind. As a result, even in the
eighteenth century, parties to the suit were, in theory, those who
were literally “before the court” and, therefore, within courts’ power
to bind their interests.77
This definition of the term “party” is consistent throughout
eighteenth-century dictionaries, treatises, and cases. Giles Jacob’s
widely-used law dictionary, for example, defined the “Parties to a
Suit” as the plaintiffs and defendants who carry on the suit.78
The terms “plaintiff ” and “defendant” were settled terms for the
active litigants “in court” who submitted their rights to a def-
initive resolution by the judicial power.79 Treatises80 and cases,81 in
75. The use of the term “party” to describe the persons who appear in court to present
claims and defenses appears in Bracton. 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND
304 (Samuel Thorne trans., 1997) [hereinafter 2 BRACTON] (describing the persons who appear
in court as the “actor” or plaintiff and “reus” or defendant and as the “part[ies] to the
proceedings”).
76. 2 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 105 (3d ed. 1923) (noting the rule
that “[t]here was no power to try any case, civil or criminal, in the absence of the other party,”
a rule “common to other bodies of early Germanic law,” which was “perhaps founded upon the
idea that recourse to a law court depends upon the consent of the parties”).
77. 9 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 252 (1926) [hereinafter 9
HOLDSWORTH] (“[I]n [eighteenth century] legal theory both plaintiff and defendant must
appear personally in court by themselves or their attornies.”). 
78. GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1762) (“The Parties to a Suit, are the
Plaintiff and Defendant who carry on the same.”).
79. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 25 (1768)
[hereinafter 3 BLACKSTONE] (“[I]n every court there must be at least three constituent parts,
... the actor, or plaintiff, who complains of an injury done; the reus, or defendant, who is called
upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex or judicial power, which is to examine the truth
of the fact, to determine the law arising upon that fact, and ... apply the remedy.”); see also
2 BRACTON, supra note 75, at 304 (describing persons who appear in court as “plaintiff,” or
“actor,” and “demandant,” or “reus”).
80. See, e.g., 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 162, 164, 21 Eng. Rep. 959, 960 (Ch. 1902) (“All original
Parties to the Suit, and likewise all those who come in pendente Lite, and are made Parties
thereto by Process, are bound by the Decree.”); 1 JOSEPH HARRISON, THE ACCOMPLISH’D
PRACTISER IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 32 (1779) [hereinafter 1 HARRISON] (“[N]one but
such as were parties and those claiming under them can be bound by [a decree].”).
81. See, e.g., Anonymous, 1 Ves. Jun. 29, 29, 30 Eng. Rep. 215, 215 (Ch. 1789) (dismissing
bill for failure to make interested person a “party,” based on the rule that all interested
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turn, consistently defined “parties” as persons “before the court” or
“brought into Court” who could be “bound by the decree” or judg-
ment. 
This understanding was, of course, also the assumption behind
the necessary parties rule in equity, which provided that equity
could act only when every interested person had been brought
“before the Court” as parties,82 meaning that all interested persons
had met whatever requirements might apply to bring their rights
within equity’s preclusive power, setting the stage for a final,
definitive resolution of the underlying dispute.83
In the eighteenth century, the party, then, was a kind of fiction:
When courts referred to those persons who were not physically
before the court as “parties to the suit,” they indicated that these
persons were treated as if they were “before the court,” and
therefore subject to the court’s preclusive power, in the same way
that persons who had literally appeared in the ancient royal and
communal courts had subjected themselves to the courts’ power to
determine their rights against their interests.84 In effect, the term
persons who the plaintiff seeks to affect through the decree must be “brought into Court”);
Poore v. Clark, 2 Atk. 515, 515-16, 26 Eng. Rep. 710, 710 (Ch. 1742) (“[T]he general rule is,
that if you draw the jurisdiction out of a court of law, you must have all persons parties before
this court, who will be necessary to make the determination complete.”); Vernon v. Blackerby,
Barn. C. 377, 379, 27 Eng. Rep. 686, 686 (Ch. 1740) (considering “[w]hether [the Plaintiff] has
brought proper Parties before the Court”).
82. See, e.g., Poore, 2 Atk. at 515, 26 Eng. Rep. at 710 (stating that to enter a complete
decree “you must have all persons parties before this court”).
83. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at 442 (“This bill must call all necessary
parties, however remotely concerned in interest, before the court; otherwise no decree can be
made to bind them.”). For a collection of statements of this general rule from treatises of the
period, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural
Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1262-70 (1961). 
84. See F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: TWO
COURSES OF LECTURES 300-01 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1929) (“[T]he words
‘really and truly’ seem hardly applicable to any part of the procedure of the eighteenth
century, so full was it of fictions contrived to get modern results out of medieval premises.”);
L. L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 390 (1930) (noting that while “[t]he Roman
fiction was an assumptive fiction, a fiction taking an ‘as if ’ form; [and] the English fiction was
(and is) a fiction ordinarily taking an ‘is’ or assertive form,” the difference is purely stylistic).
The term “party to a suit” in true in rem actions—that is, actions against property—
suggests more can be said about the eighteenth-century “party” concept. True in rem
judgments bound the whole world and therefore “all the world” was a “part[y] to the sentence”
in rem. But only those who had actually asserted a claim in the proceeding against the
property were considered “parties to the suit” in such actions. See, e.g., United States v. The
Anthony Mangin, 24 F. Cas. 833, 834 (D. Pa. 1802) (No. 14,461).
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“party” was a placeholder for larger theoretical questions about the
scope of courts’ power to issue preclusive judgments.
2. The Relationship Between “Suits” and “Parties” 
Consistent with the view that a court’s power extended no further
than the parties “before the court,” eighteenth-century treatises and
courts defined a “suit” as an association, or relation, that subsisted
only “between” the “parties to the suit.”85 If the “suit” were matter,
the “party to the suit” was an atom—the suit’s component piece or
building block.
The procedural rules governing the suit’s commencement and
perpetuation reflect this relationship between the “suit” and its
“parties.” The suit, and with it the court’s jurisdiction to proceed to
a final judgment, “commenced” when adverse persons could be
considered constructively “before the court” as “parties”;86 and, as a
corollary, adverse persons were deemed constructively “before the
The in rem decisions’ use of the term “party to the suit” is consistent either with treating
“parties” as the subset of those bound whose interests in the subject matter were concrete and
nonspeculative, or with treating party-plaintiffs as those who consented to judicial
determination of their interests, or both. For more evidence that eighteenth-century sources
may have viewed party-plaintiffs as those who consented to be bound, see infra note 128.
Because the sources do not identify which of these, or other, additional limiting principles are
also in play, the only semantic meaning unambiguously attested by conventional definitions
and usage of the term is that “party” served as a label for those within the court’s power to
bind. Any additional limiting principles must be specified by construction, not interpretation. 
85. See, e.g., Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 464 (1829)
(Marshall, J.) (“[I]f a right is litigated between parties in a Court of Justice, the proceeding
by which the decision of the Court is sought is a suit.”); Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4
Call.) 5, 14 (1782) (Pendleton, J.) (noting the terms “suits and controversies” mean “disputes
between litigant parties”); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at 22 (defining a “suit in courts” as
a proceeding “wherein the act of the parties and the act of the law co-operate; the act of the
parties being necessary to set the law in motion, and the process of the law being in general
the only instrument, by which the parties are enabled to procure a certain and adequate
redress”).
86. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 252 (“[T]he evolution of the rules ... for
beginning an action[ ] is intimately bound up with the evolution of the rules for securing the
appearance of the defendant.”); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal
Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1568 (2002) (noting that in the eighteenth century, “the
very existence of most kinds of judicial proceedings depend[ed] upon the presence (actual or
constructive) of adverse parties”). See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text for further
discussion. The eighteenth-century jurisdictional term for lack of jurisdiction, coram non
judice, underscores the link between jurisdiction and constructive presence in court. “Coram
non judice” means “not in the presence of a judge.”
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court” when the initial procedures necessary to trigger the court’s
power to decide their rights had been completed.87
Once commenced, the suit continued to exist only so long as
parties remained before the court. Failure to file pleadings in a
timely manner resulted in the absence of a party from court and a
negation of the suit, or “nonsuit.”88 Similarly, the suit abated if a
party died.89 Together, all of these rules underscore that the suit’s
existence was inseparable from its “parties”—those before the court,
whom the court had the power to bind. 
The magical moment at which persons were considered “before
the court,” thereby both becoming “parties” and commencing the
suit, differed over time depending on the nature of the suit. For
example, at the end of the seventeenth century, the defendant in
Common Pleas or King’s Bench constructively appeared when, after
service of process by the sheriff, he filed “common bail” as security
for his participation in the suit.90 The plaintiff ’s appearance
87. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text. 
88. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at 315-16 (“[F]rom the time of the defendant’s
appearance ... it is necessary that both the parties be kept or continued in court ... till the final
determination of the suit.” Failure to properly file required pleadings resulted in lapse of
appearance and in the negation of the suit, or “nonsuit.”).
89. Id. at 301-02. Actions at law involving torts committed by the defendant could not be
revived by or against representatives of the decedent because the right was personal to the
decedent. In equity, a suit involving impersonal rights (for example, property) could be revived
if the executor or other successor in interest of the decedent filed a bill of revivor. Contractual
suits at law, which were viewed as a species of property, could also be revived by or against
successors in interest to the decedent. Id. at 302. 
90. Traditionally, securing the defendant’s appearance in Common Pleas, for example,
required the purchase of an original writ stating the plaintiff’s form of action and the
simultaneous “suing out” of compulsory process against a defendant. The compulsory process
in turn, took the form of a writ directing the sheriff to arrest the defendant. In Common Pleas,
the writ directing the sheriff to arrest the defendant was called the capias ad respondendum;
in the King’s Bench, the typical compulsory process was the Bill of Middlesex. 9 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 77, at 249-50 (cataloguing forms of compulsory process); see also Nathan Levy, Jr.,
Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52,
68-69 (1968) (discussing appearance by filing bail).
Prior to the eighteenth century, plaintiffs proceeding in Common Pleas typically purchased
the writ and then served a summons on the defendant. If the defendant did not respond to the
summons, the plaintiff sued out a capias against the defendant. Id. at 61-62. By the
eighteenth century, the capias had become the “first process” against the defendant in
Common Pleas, in order to speed the commencement of the suit, a development precipitated
by Common Pleas’s competition with the King’s Bench, which offered speedier compulsory
process. Id. at 78; see, e.g., S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 61-
65 (2d ed. 1981). 
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depended on the defendant’s: when the defendant “appeared” by
filing common bail, the plaintiff was brought into court with him.91
However, anticipating the concept of default judgments, Parlia-
ment, in the early eighteenth century, created mechanisms that
allowed the court to proceed to judgment in cases in which a person
had been served with process but had not entered a formal appear-
ance, by allowing the plaintiff to enter an appearance for the
defendant.92 American colonies adopted a similar rule much
earlier.93
As a functional matter, then, service of process, not formal
appearance, became the key to a court’s power to decide the defen-
dant’s rights.94 And by the final decades of the eighteenth century,
91. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 252 (“On the part of the plaintiff, no formality
expressive of appearance is observed, but, upon appearance of the defendant ... both parties
are considered as in Court.”).
92. In 1725, Parliament provided that if the defendant did not appear within four to eight
days upon the return of process by the sheriff, the plaintiff could enter an appearance for the
defendant “as if he had really appeared; and may file common bail in the defendant’s name,
and proceed thereupon as if the defendant had done it himself.” 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note
79, at 287; see, e.g., An Act To Prevent Frivolous and Vexatious Arrests, 1725, 12 Geo., c. 29,
§ 1 (Eng.); Nelson, supra note 86, at 1570 & n.39 (“After being properly served ... the court
could proceed to judgment as if the defendant had really appeared.”). In personal actions, the
court was limited to a judgment of outlawry if the defendant could not be personally served;
actual service remained essential in order to actually enter a default judgment on the issues
raised in the suit. Levy, supra note 90, at 95.
Parliament provided by statute for decrees pro confesso against defendants in equity who
evaded service. An Act for Making Process in Courts of Equity Effectual Against Persons Who
Abscond, and Cannot Be Served Therewith, or Who Refuse To Appear, 1732, 5 Geo. 2, c. 25,
§ 1 (Eng.). 
Default judgments had long been available in in rem actions, Nelson, supra note 86, at
1570-71 & n.44, although the summons in in rem actions could be served “either to the person
... or upon the land demanded.” GEORGE BOOTH, THE NATURE AND PRACTICE OF REAL ACTIONS,
IN THEIR WRITS AND PROCESS, BOTH ORIGINAL AND JUDICIAL 4 (John Anthon ed., 1808). 
While quasi-in rem attachment jurisdiction was still in its infancy, default judgments,
satisfied by the attached property, were available in such proceedings after “the initial
issuance of a summons commanding the defendant to appear and answer the plaintiff ’s
allegations,” which was usually issued simultaneously with the writ of attachment. See
Nelson, supra note 86, at 1573-74. 
93. Levy, supra note 90, at 69 n.84.
94. See, e.g., Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 126 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786) (“[F]ull credence
ought to be given to judgments of the courts in any of the United States, where both parties
are within the jurisdiction of such courts at the time of commencing the suit, and are duly
served with the process.”). 
The idea that one could not be bound without receiving service of process would, of course,
become part of the settled understanding of constitutional “due process” in Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877) (“[A]ppearance or personal service [are required] before the defendant
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the alchemy of eighteenth-century legal fictions transformed the
service of a summons into the mechanism that constructively
brought both the plaintiff who sued out the summons and the
defendant to whom it was directed “before the court” as parties for
jurisdictional purposes.95 The old act of “appearance,” once essential
to the suit’s commencement and party status, was demoted to a
mere ratification of a fact service had already accomplished.
Blackstone’s treatment of the “commencement of the suit” shows
the marks of this transition: while he defines the “commencement
of a suit” as the means by which “the cause is ... drawn into ...
could be personally bound by any judgment rendered.”). 
95. This is reflected in a shift from treating persons who entered an appearance to persons
who were served as “parties.” Compare Windsor v. Windsor, Dick. 707, 707, 21 Eng. Rep. 446,
446 (Ch. 1788) (“The naming of a party in the bill as defendant, and not praying process
against him, is not considered as making him a party.”), with Izraell v. Nawbourne, 1 Vern.
87, 87, 23 Eng. Rep. 329, 329 (Rolls 1682) (explaining that to make a person named as
defendant in the bill a party, plaintiff must “serve[ ] him to answer” and he must be “brought
to hearing”). For other early nineteenth-century statements that service, but not appearance,
determines party-status, see Hart v. Granger, 1 Conn. 154, 167 (1814) (stating that a case is
properly before the court “if there are proper parties before it, or rather if the plaintiff in that
suit has a right to call the defendants before the court to answer his claim, and they are
properly called”); Baron v. Abeel, 3 Johns 481, 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808) (“The service of a
declaration in ejectment on the tenant in possession is considered as much the commencement
of the suit, as the service of a capias ad respondendum in personal actions.”); Gibson v.
Haines, 1 Hare 317, 318, 66 Eng. Rep. 1054, 1054 (V. Ch. 1842) (argument of counsel) (noting
that in equity the “Defendant, upon being served with a copy of the bill, may be bound by all
the proceedings” and “no person is deemed a party unless his name is in the prayer of process,
and the prayer of process is always referred to in the offices, as showing who are the parties
to the suit”); see also Levy, supra note 90, at 69 (discussing that the plaintiff’s right to enter
an appearance for defendant marked “the practical transition from arrest to summons in the
beginning of personal civil actions in the [English] superior courts”); Nelson, supra note 86,
at 1568 (showing that while the “very existence of most kinds of judicial proceedings
depend[ed] upon the presence ... of adverse parties,” by the late eighteenth century,
defendants were considered constructively “in” court “upon the issuance of some sort of
command ordering the defendant to appear”). 
In one pre-1725 decision, Fawkes v. Pratt, 1 P. Wms. 593, 593, 24 Eng. Rep. 531, 531 (Ch.
1719), the chancellor also stated that “[t]hey only are defendants ... against whom process is
prayed,” but, as Izraell suggests, the statement should, at that point, be read as a statement
of a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for making a person a party. Izraell, 1 Vern.
at 87, 23 Eng. Rep. at 329.
By the time Pennoyer was decided in the United States (in 1877), American courts ceased
to connect service of summons and its effect on the court’s jurisdiction to bind with the
definition of a “party,” a fact reflected in Pennoyer itself: while Justice Field treated service
as a precondition for exercise of jurisdiction in personam, questions about whether persons
had been brought before the court as “parties” did no work in his analysis. 
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Court[ ],”96 he waffles between suggesting that the suit “commenced”
(1) upon appearance of the plaintiff and defendant in the traditional
way97 and, alternatively, (2) upon service of process.98 American
courts of the period tended toward the latter view of the “commence-
ment” of a suit.99
96. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at 286 (“Thus differently do the three courts set out at
first, in the commencement of a suit ... [and] by this means the ... cause is ... drawn into the
respective courts.”).
97. Id. at 285 (“[A]s soon as [the defendant] appears, or puts in bail, to the process, he is
deemed by so doing to be in such custody of the marshall, as will give the court [of King’s
Bench] a jurisdiction to proceed.”).
98. Id. at 286-92 (suggesting that commencement is accomplished after the service of the
“first process,” and that subsequent proceedings to compel the defendant to answer occur
“[a]fterwards, when the cause is once drawn into ... court[ ]”). Blackstone’s waffle was driven
by the peculiarities of the jurisdictional divisions between the courts of Common Pleas and
King’s Bench. Traditionally, constructive appearance (via arrest) was essential to establish
the jurisdiction of the King’s Bench and Exchequer vis-à-vis Common Pleas. Id. at 285-86
(noting that “once the defendant is taken into custody of the marshall” the King’s Bench had
power to hear causes originally committed exclusively to Common Pleas); see also MAITLAND,
supra note 84, at 296. Yet, even though he repeats the familiar mantra that arrest was
necessary to commence an action in King’s Bench, Blackstone, in the passage from the
Commentaries cited at the start of this note, which follows the discussion of “first process” in
the law courts and precedes and introduces general discussion of the mechanisms for
compelling appearance, seems to assume that “first process” was sufficient to “draw[ ]” the
cause into court in all of the superior courts. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at 286 (“Thus
differently do the three courts set out at first.... Afterwards, when the cause is once drawn
into the respective courts, the method of pursuing it is pretty much the same in all of them.”).
But see Foster v. Bonner, 2 Cowp. 454, 455, 98 Eng. Rep. 1183, 1184 (K.B. 1776) (Mansfield,
C.J.) (explaining that when a constructive arrest via service of a summons precedes the filing
of a bill of complaint, the date that the bill is filed, rather than the prior date of the “summons
to bring the defendant into Court,” marks the commencement of a suit). 
The uncertainty hints at the shift that would be accomplished in the nineteenth century,
when courts would dispense with the requirement that defendants formally “appear” by filing
bail entirely, recognizing, as we generally still do today, that the parties are before the court
in a way that brings them within the court’s power to decide their rights, once the plaintiff
has adequately served process commanding a defendant to appear. See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S.
at 734; STEPHEN & PINDER, supra note 74, at 21 (describing mid-nineteenth century consensus
on the availability of default judgments against defendant who had been summoned but had
not appeared).
In equity, a suit in equity “commenced” once a bill had been filed; here, too, though
“commencement” of the suit was also keyed to service of process because in equity the filing
of the bill that included a proper “prayer” of process automatically caused a subpoena (the
form of process that issued from chancery) to issue against the named defendant. CHARLES
BARTON, AN HISTORICAL TREATISE OF A SUIT IN EQUITY 58, 61-62 (1796) (showing that a suit
in equity is commenced by Bill and upon filing the bill a “writ of Subpoena issues out of the
Law side of [chancery], requiring the Defendant (as prayed in the Bill) to appear and answer
the charges”).
99. See Baron, 3 Johns at 482 (explaining that because failure to appear following proper
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For our purposes, three important features of the meaning of the
“suit” at the time of ratification stand out: The suit “commenced”
after the court was deemed to have adverse parties before it.100
Persons were deemed to be “parties” before the court when whatever
procedures thought essential to trigger the court’s power to decide
their rights—increasingly, service of process on the defendant101—
had been completed. And the suit continued to exist only so long as
the persons made parties through process remained constructively
“before the court,” underscoring that the “suit’s” existence was
inseparable from its “parties.”102
In effect, the baroque fictions governing the magic moment at
which the suit commenced, while various, expressed a consistent
definitional principle: a suit existed only “between” the persons who
service entitles plaintiff to a default judgment, “[t]he service of a declaration in ejectment on
the tenant in possession is considered as much the commencement of the suit, as the service
of a capias ad respondendum in personal actions”); Boyce v. Morgan, Cole. & Cai. Cas. 476,
476-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (reporter’s note) (arguing that although “levying the plaint was
the commencement of the suit; ... the court ... ruled that issuing the summons, or warrant,
was the beginning of the action”); Nicholson’s Lessee v. Wallis, 4 U.S. 154, 154-55 (Pa. 1798)
(holding that “the service of the declaration in ejectment upon the defendant, was a
commencement of the suit”). But see Darlings v. Corey, 1 N.J.L. 200, 201 (1793) (“The
appearance of the parties on the summons was a regular commencement of the suit.”).
100. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
101. Cases of the period did not uniformly distinguish between the sheriff’s actual “service”
of process on the defendant and the “issuance” of the first process either for purposes of
constructively making someone a “party” for jurisdictional purposes or for demarcating the
“commencement” of the suit. Compare Baron, 3 Johns at 482 (stating, in action at law, that
“service ... is considered ... the commencement of the suit”), with Hart v. Granger, 1 Conn. 154,
168 (1814) (explaining that an equity court has parties before it if they are “properly called”),
and Windsor v. Windsor, Dick 707, 21 Eng. Rep. 446 (Ch. 1788) (explaining that a person is
considered a party in equity if they are named in the prayer of process). This difference in
emphasis may reflect common law courts’ reliance on facts about service evidenced in the
pleadings to establish prima facie jurisdiction, Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional
Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1870-73 (2007), but may also reflect procedural
differences in the availability of a default judgment in law and equity. See Baron, 3 Johns at
482-83 (linking commencement, service, and the procedures triggering default judgments).
In a legal action involving personal rights, actual service was necessary to trigger the court’s
power to enter a default judgment, when the defendant failed to answer, although issuance
of service, coupled with failure of actual service, could be the basis for a judgment of outlawry.
See supra note 92. In legal actions involving property, either actual service or service on the
land triggered the right to a default judgment. Id. In equity, a judgment pro confesso was
available after issuance of process if the defendant either did not appear or could not be found;
hence the rule in equity that party-status depended on the naming of the defendant in the
prayer of process. Id.
102. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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had been brought, via “due process,”103 within the court’s power to
bind.104 Persons who were not within that power were outside the
scope of a “suit.”105
3. Expansion of the Concepts of Parties and Suits in         
Representative Contexts
Because it was a fiction designed to paper over untheorized
expansions of courts’ preclusive power, the concept of “parties to the
suit” was not static. Rather, its applications expanded in the
eighteenth century, foreshadowing the modern law of representa-
tion. In those cases, the concept of a “suit” expanded as well—to
encompass not only the persons who were brought before the court
in a way that subjected them to a court’s full preclusive power, but
also persons brought “before the court” and subject to the preclusive
power “in a sense.”106 This shift, in turn, is crucial to understanding
the outer scope of diversity jurisdiction in the special category of
representative actions.
This expansion of the party concept began in the seventeenth
century, in cases where equity excused the necessary party rule in
suits brought by tenants of a manor (usually the inhabitants of an
entire village or villages) seeking to settle the common customary
obligations that the tenants, as a class, owed to the manor lord.107
In these cases, a few of the tenants filed a bill in equity in their
own names108 and pled that the bill was filed “on behalf of ” the other
tenants.109 Under the usual rules, these absent persons were not
103. See BOOTH, supra note 92, at 73 (discussing judgment properly entered upon
constructive appearance after return of “due process” by the sheriff).
104. As discussed in the next Section, “parties” to a suit included both persons who were
within the court’s power to bind in a full sense and persons over whom a court had a limited
power to bind. See infra notes 107-28 and accompanying text. 
105. As the next Section shows, the concept of a suit expands in the late eighteenth century
to encompass passive represented persons who can be bound “in a sense.” 
106. See infra notes 107-29 and accompanying text.
107. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 94 (1987).
108. Cases involving group litigating by tenants occurred in the medieval period, before the
rise of the necessary party rule, but by the seventeenth century the practice had become
unfamiliar. See id. at 72-99.
109. Id. at 93-99.
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parties because they were not named in the bill.110 And plaintiffs
had every reason to want to avoid making them parties: the death
of a party abated a suit in equity and required the filing of a bill of
revivor, which recommenced the suit all over again, requiring
relitigation of matters previously litigated.111
The chancellors dealt with the problem by excusing the tenants
from the necessary party rule: as the Lord Keeper said in Brown v.
Howard, a suit by some tenants to determine the scope of a
common, and legally fungible, customary obligation imposed on all
the tenants as a group was “the Case”—the legal dispute or claim
—“of all” and, therefore, all tenants need not be made parties.112 Yet,
the reported decisions confirm that the nonparty tenants would
nonetheless be bound by the decree: “[i]f the [absentee tenants]
should not be bound” by the litigation, said Lord Nottingham in
Brown v. Vermuden, “[s]uits of this Nature ... would be infinite, and
impossible to be ended.”113
The manorial tenure cases created a precedent for excusing the
necessary party rule in other associational cases, including precur-
sors of modern shareholder derivative suits brought by shareholders
of unincorporated associations.114 As we proceed into the eighteenth
century, however, equity begins to call the absent persons whose
joinder is excused in these cases “parties.” In Chancey v. May, for
example, shareholders of the Temple Brass Works, an unincorpo-
rated association, filed suit “in behalf of themselves, and all other
proprietors and partners” (numbering eight hundred shareholders)
110. Id. at 162-63.
111. Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History
of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 243 & n.65 (1990) [hereinafter Bone,
Litigative Forms] (renewing YEAZELL, supra note 107).
112. See Brown v. Howard, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 164, 21 Eng. Rep. 960 (Ch. 1701) (discussing
Vermuden); YEAZELL, supra note 107, at 163 (noting the Lord Keeper uses “case” in sense of
shared claim or legal dispute). In the mid-seventeenth century, Lord Nottingham required the
named plaintiffs to produce a “register” showing that absentees had authorized the suit. By
the start of the eighteenth century, the chancellors seem to have dispensed with that
requirement, at least, in cases involving fungible customary rights. YEAZELL, supra note 107,
at 146, 162-63. There are some suggestions that the requirement of prior authorization
persisted in other contexts. See infra note 125. 
113. 1 Chanc. Cas. 272, 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796, 797 (Ch. 1676); see also Howard, 21 Eng.
Rep. at 960 (“[A]ll [are] bound, though only a few [are] Parties; else, where there are such
Numbers, no Right could be done, if all must be Parties; for there would be perpetual
abatements.”).
114. YEAZELL, supra note 107, at 166-79.
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against thirteen officers to “call them to ... account for several
misapplications, mismanagements, and embezzlements.”115 The
defendant demurred, on the grounds that “all the rest of the
proprietors were not ... parties, and so ... they might be harassed
and perplexed with multiplicity of suits.”116 Lord Hardwicke,
however, dismissed this fear because, he reasoned, the absent
shareholders were, by dint of being “proprietors of the same
undertaking” as the plaintiffs, “in effect parties,” without explaining
exactly why this was the case.117
By the mid-eighteenth century, equity relied on Chancey and
the tenure cases to allow creditors to file bills seeking an accounting
of the debtors’ assets without making all creditors parties in the
traditional way and, similarly, to allow the crews of privateering
vessels to file bills seeking an accounting of the proper distribution
of shares of the prize captured from enemy ships. By the 1750s,
equity was calling absent creditors in a bill of accounting “plaintiffs”
when the bill was filed by some creditors on behalf of the others. For
example, in Leigh v. Thomas, a prize case, the court suggested that
absent crewmates in a bill seeking an account of each crewmember’s
shares of the prize could be “brought before” the court as, variously,
“parties” or “plaintiffs” if, on the model of a creditor suit, the actual
plaintiffs sue “on behalf of ” the absent crewmembers.118
Robert Bone writes that in the creditor and prize cases, recog-
nition of absentees as parties “expanded the intervention oppor-
tunities open to absentees,” but “had nothing to do with binding
them.”119 This overstates the case. In such cases, the suit involved
two decrees. First, after the bill was filed and the defendants had
answered, the chancellor issued—as a matter of course—a decree
directing a master to undertake an accounting of the assets at
issue.120 Once that first decree issued, the represented absentees lost
115. Prec. Ch. 592, 592, 24 Eng. Rep. 265, 265 (Ch. 1722).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Leigh v. Thomas, 2 Ves. Sen. 312, 313, 28 Eng. Rep. 201, 201 (Ch. 1751) (“No doubt
but a bill may be by a few creditors in behalf of themselves and the rest, ... and then the
decree lets in all the others; and they are considered as plaintiffs.”); see also Neve v. Weston,
3 Atk. 557, 557, 26 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1121 (Ch. 1747) (“A man who comes in before a Master
under a decree, is quasi a party to that suit.”). 
119. Bone, Litigative Forms, supra note 111, at 243-44.
120. Geoffrey C. Hazard, John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the
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their right to seek alternative remedies at law, although they
retained the right to litigate their shares in the accounting in
equity.121 In effect, the legal claims of absent creditors and crew
members were merged into, and barred by, the equitable suit—they
were subject to what we would today call a form of claim preclusion.
And in exchange for the loss of their rights at law, absentees were
given expanded intervention opportunities in the equitable account-
ing.122
As a result, when a suit was instituted “on behalf of ” absent
creditors or crew members, these absent persons fell within the
preclusive reach of the court on the basis of the representative
nature of the bill, although not to the same degree as persons who
had been made parties in the traditional way.123
Binding Effects of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1869 (1998).
121. Id. at 1869-70 (“After the initial decree, no creditor or legatee could proceed by an
action at law to collect his debt or legacy.”). In effect, represented parties were treated as
“before the court” because they had nowhere else to go.
122. While the death of a person who had affirmatively appeared before the court ended
the suit, the death of a represented “party” did not. CALVERT, supra note 73, at 31; Bone,
Litigative Forms, supra note 111, at 244 n.70. Thus, the representative “suit’s” existence did
not depend on the continued presence of represented parties brought “before the court”
through representation. But the represented persons were nonetheless treated as part of the
suit at the time of its commencement: in exchange for the loss of their rights at law, they were
considered sufficiently part of the suit that they could file a writ of error, file a bill of revivor
if the representative died, and take advantage of the final decree to the same degree as
traditional parties. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS § 96, at 80
(1838) (suing “in behalf of ” absentees allows the absentees to “come in under the decree, and
take the benefit of it, or show it to be erroneous, or entitle themselves to a rehearing”); Bone,
Litigative Forms, supra note 111, at 244 n.70 (collecting authorities).
123. YEAZELL, supra note 107, at 183 (explaining that Leigh required the “suit be brought
on behalf of all [ ] on the grounds that crew members not a party to the share-assignment
agreement would not be bound by it in subsequent litigation”); Hazard, Gedid & Sowle, supra
note 120, at 1871; see also Bone, Litigative Forms, supra note 111, at 244. 
The creditor cases treated absent creditors as “parties” under the necessary parties rule
only in those cases where the interests of the plaintiffs and absentees were aligned. Mortgage
creditors could not represent general creditors; creditors could not represent other creditors
when seeking to establish “the priority of their claims as against other creditors.” Hazard,
Gedid & Sowle, supra note 120, at 1867-69. In those cases, chancery required the absentees
to be joined through traditional process. As a result, absentee creditors were not “parties”
unless representation satisfied “what we now call ‘fairness’ and ‘adequacy’ of
representation”—underscoring that courts reserved the term party for absentees that
chancery considered it “fair,” at the time the suit was filed, to bind at least in a limited sense.
Id. at 1868.
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The same implication is evident in associational cases, like
Chancey v. May.124 There, defendants’ concerns about multiple liti-
gation were premised on the assumption that the absent sharehold-
ers were not “parties” and therefore beyond the preclusive effect of
any decree. The court responded that the fear was unfounded
because the premise was false: the shareholders were in fact parties,
and, the inference follows, would be bound by the decree to some
degree. Chancellor Hardwicke, indeed, drove the point home by
affirming that the decree in the case would “com[e] at justice”—that
is, fulfill the requirement that equity would make a complete and
final resolution of the dispute.125
In effect, the case law defining the “party” concept follows a
predictable pattern replicated throughout the fiction-ridden English
common law: individual courts innovate, in our case by expanding
the scope of persons who can be bound. Later courts paper over a
gap between the innovation and legal theory with a fiction: in our
case, courts, unable to explain the expansion of preclusion in light
of a larger theory of res judicata, simply papered over the theoretical
gap by assigning the term “party”—the label for persons subject to
the preclusive power of the court—to represented persons.
Thus, at the time of ratification, the concept of a suit was
changing—from an older view which understood a “suit” to encom-
pass only those persons who had either sued out process or received
124. Prec. Ch. 592, 24 Eng. Rep. 265 (1722).
125.  Id. The exact degree to which members of the association were bound is debatable—as
Hazard, Gedid, and Sowle note, it is possible they may have been subject to the limited
preclusive effect that occurred in creditor and prize cases by losing their right to proceed
independently at law. See Hazard, Gedid & Sowle, supra note 120, at 1874 (suggesting that
the court in Chancey may have envisioned that absentees, “if they wished to maintain the
litigation, would be compelled to become parties to the instant case rather than proceed
separately” at law). As in the creditor cases, the absentees were, apparently, treated as proper
objects of preclusion either on the theory they consented to representation (with consent
presumed from the fact that rights litigated arose out of a “prior voluntary association ... with
a commercial enterprise”) or an adequacy of representation theory, based on the fact the
named plaintiffs and absentees had a shared “defined right” and the representatives therefore
“acted in their interest.” See YEAZELL, supra note 107, at 178, 182-83. But see Bone, Litigative
Forms, supra note 111, at 242-57 (arguing representation was not based on theories of agency
but rather on the formal similarity between the abstract legal rights and duties presented by
those in court and those out of court). Leigh seems to suggest prior authorization of the crew
members may have been required, at least in prize cases. Leigh v. Thomas, 2 Ves. Sen. 312,
312-13, 28 Eng. Rep. 201, 201-02 (Ch. 1751) (suggesting plaintiffs can bring bill “in behalf of
the whole crew” if “authorised”; presumably by the other crewmembers).
2009] A NEW LOOK AT THE DIVERSITY CLAUSE 1147
service, thereby bringing them under the court’s full power to bind
their interests, to a newer view, which understood a “suit” to en-
compass passive persons, like represented parties, who were joined
to the preclusive effect of a suit “[i]n a sense,”126 in exchange for
special intervention rights. Both the older and newer concepts of a
“suit,” however, encompassed only those persons who were “before
the Court”127 in a way sufficient to subject them, to some extent, to
the court’s power to bind.128
126. See, e.g., Adair v. New River Co., 11 Ves. Jun. 429, 444, 32 Eng. Rep. 1153, 1159 (Ch.
1805) (stating that in “the case of persons, suing on behalf of themselves and all others,”
absentees are “in a sense ... before the Court”).
127. Id.
128. By the early nineteenth century, English chancery courts settled on calling
represented persons “quasi parties,” reflecting both that they were subject to lesser preclusive
effect than traditional parties (in that they were bound to pursue relief in equity, but could
litigate their shares due under the final accounting) and that the person’s continuous
constructive “presence” was not essential to the continuous existence of the suit. See, e.g.,
Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jun. 321, 326-27, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1007 (Ch. 1809) (noting
in prize case that “where it is impracticable to make parties, and yet the Court can by
arrangement afterwards introduce the persons, as Quasi parties, the Court does not require,
that they shall be parties on the record”). 
To be sure, not every eighteenth century case neatly followed the lead of Brown, Chancey,
and Leigh. During the chancellorship of Lord Thurlow from the 1770s through the mid-1790s,
for example, equity courts pushed back against these innovations, refusing to condone
exceptions to the necessary party rule, to extend the term party to represented persons, or to
recognize a power to bind persons who had not been joined through the traditional process.
Hazard, Gedid & Sowle, supra note 120, at 1866 (“Toward the latter part of the eighteenth
century, Chancery began to apply the Necessary Parties Rule with greater inflexibility.”). In
Moffat v. Farquharson, the master of the rolls, Lord Kenyon, appeared to overrule Leigh v.
Thomas sub judice by holding, in an apparently identical prize case, that crew members must
be made parties in the traditional way. 2 Bro. C.C. 338, 29 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch. 1788).
Moreover, not all courts applied the term “party” to absent persons who were treated as new
objects of res judicata. Some courts in the first half of the eighteenth century, for example,
experimented with other labels, including early intimations of the concept of “privity.” See,
e.g., Brown v. Vermuden, 1 Chan. Cas. 272, 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796, 797 (1676) (objection that
absentee should not be bound “for that he was not Party or privy”); Bone, Litigative Forms,
supra note 111, at 239. In the eighteenth century, however, the privity concept remained
largely confined to relationships or rights related to property. See, e.g., WILLIAM RASTELL, LES
TERMES DE LA LEY: OR, CERTAIN DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE WORDS AND TERMS OF THE COMMON
AND STATUTE LAWS OF THIS REALM, NOW IN USE, EXPOUNDED AND EXPLAINED 489 (1721)
(defining “privities” to include cases where “the Tenant holds of the Lord by certain Service”
and “where a Lease is made to hold at will, for Years, for Life, or a Feoffment in Fee”). 
Nonetheless, no matter the scope of the court’s preclusive power assumed in any particular
case, the term, when used, was applied to those who were fairly subject, at least to some
degree, to the court’s power to bind their rights against their interests.
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The upshot of this history for our interpretive puzzle? To the
extent that Article III uses the term controversies to mean suits, the
Heads of Jurisdiction that depend on the identity of the persons
“between” whom a suit subsists turn, at their broadest, on the
identity of persons within the court’s power to bind “in some sense”
at the time jurisdiction is tested—but who need not be subject to the
court’s full preclusive power.129
B. “Disputes”
What if Article III uses “controversies,” as Hamilton suggested,
to mean “dispute”? To define the limits of the suit, eighteenth-
century procedural law distinguished between the parties to the suit
and the persons “interested” in the underlying “dispute” or “ques-
tion.” Suits occurred “between” parties to the suit. “Interested”
persons, in turn, were not parties to the suit, but were parties to the
larger “dispute” out of which the suit arose.130 The distinction had
the biggest doctrinal significance in equity, where persons who were
not parties but were “interested” in the underlying dispute were
required to be made parties to the suit in order to bring them within
the court’s preclusive power, thereby ensuring complete relief. 
The distinction, which will prove important later when we turn
to the text of Article III, also highlights the need for a careful
reading of eighteenth-century cases: Because interested persons
were, albeit rarely in the eighteenth century, sometimes called
“parties” “interested” in the larger dispute, careless reading of the
case law can lead a reader to conflate the concepts of parties to
the suit and persons interested in the question. In the infrequent
instances where the term “party” was used to refer to persons
interested in the dispute that preceded a filed suit, but not joined
through process, eighteenth-century cases always referred to the
interested person as a “party in interest” or a “party concerned in
the question,” while referring to the persons joined by process to the
129. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 84, at 524-29.
130. Compare Devit v. College of Dublin, Gilb. Rep. 241, 242, 25 Eng. Rep. 166, 167 (Ch.
1742) (using the term “Parties in Interest” to refer to persons “concerned” in a dispute about
land rights preceding the filing of any claim), with JOHN MITFORD, A TREATISE ON THE
PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY BY ENGLISH BILL 39 (1787) (“All persons
concerned in the demand ... ought to be parties, if within the jurisdiction of the court.”).
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suit as “parties to the suit” or “parties” without any such qualifica-
tion.131
To make matters even more perplexing for the casual modern
reader, case law regarding necessary parties also used the term
“affecting”—a term that traditionally meant “bound”—when
referring to persons who had not been joined as parties but were
interested in the decree. This use of the term “affecting,” which will
also prove important when we turn to Article III, grew out of its
older use to mean “bound.” The necessary parties rule, again,
provided that equity courts could not exercise jurisdiction unless
they made a complete decree, and a complete decree, in turn,
131. When discussing suits or other legal proceedings, treatises and cases of the period
were generally careful to refer to persons who were interested in the suit but had not been
served with process as “persons” interested in the suit rather than as “interested parties.”
Indeed, every major treatise of the period and every major judicial statement of the rules
governing joinder reserves the term “parties” for persons to be “brought before the court”
through formal process until the second edition of Mitford’s treatise published in 1787. Even
in that treatise, Mitford is careful to qualify his alternative use of the term “party” by
referring to “parties interested” whenever he refers to persons who have not been joined
through process, while reserving the term “party” without qualification for persons joined by
process. See, e.g., 1 HARRISON, supra note 80, at 32 (“Regularly all that are interested are to
be made parties.”); 1 GILES JACOB, THE COMPLEAT CHANCERY-PRACTISER: OR, THE WHOLE
PROCEEDINGS AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY, IN A PERFECT NEW MANNER
139 (London, Savoy 1730) [hereinafter 1 JACOB] (“[I]f those whose Right is concern’d, are not
made Parties, the Defendant may demur to such Bill.”); MITFORD, supra note 130, at 39
(noting that persons “concerned” or “affected” by the relief prayed “ought to be parties”; but
“if any ... unnecessary parties are interested, the court, upon application will in general
permit the proper alterations to be made”); see also Poore v. Clark, 2 Atk. 515, 515-16, 26 Eng.
Rep. 710, 710  (Ch. 1742) (“The general rule is, that if you draw the jurisdiction out of a court
of law, you must have all persons parties before this court, who will be necessary to make the
determination complete.”). 
In nineteenth-century cases and treatises, use of the term “party in interest” or “parties
interested” to refer to unjoined persons begins to appear with greater frequency. However,
even in the early decades of the nineteenth century, courts are generally careful to reserve the
term “party” for persons joined by process and always used this alternative sense of party
with a qualifier. Compare Wilkins v. Fry, 1 Mer. 244, 262, 35 Eng. Rep. 665, 671 (Ch. 1816)
(“[I]n equity, it is sufficient that all parties interested in the subject of the suit should be
before the Court, either in the shape of Plaintiffs or Defendants.”), with Small v. Attwood,
You. 407, 458, 159 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1072 (Exch. Div. 1832) (“[T]he general rule is that all
persons who are interested in the question must be parties to a suit instituted in a Court of
equity.”), Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jun. 321, 325, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1007 (Ch. 1809)
(“The strict rule is, that all persons, materially interested in the subject of the suit, however
numerous, ought to be parties.”), and CALVERT, supra note 73, at 11 (noting that the “general
rule” is that “[a]ll persons having an interest in the object of the suit, ought to be made
parties”). 
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required the joinder of all interested persons as parties.132 Courts
applying the rule referred to unjoined “interested” persons as
persons who would be hypothetically “affected” by a complete
decree, and therefore must be joined before the suit could go
forward.133 By the end of the eighteenth century, the term “affected”
had become a procedural term of art for nonparties interested in
questions litigated in a lawsuit in certain specific ways. Mitford’s
treatise on equity, for example, stated that the necessary parties
rule required that “all persons concerned in the demand, or who
may be affected by the relief prayed, ought to be parties.”134
The kind of “interest” that qualified one for mandatory joinder
was unsettled. “Parties in interest” or persons “affected” included
those with “remote” as well as “immediate” interests in the dispute
that gave rise to the suit.135 At a minimum, the class of interested
persons included those who, if excluded from the preclusive effect
of the decree, might collaterally attack and negate the rights
declared.136 Beyond that narrow class, however, confusion reigned
about just how “remote” an interest was before it was beyond the
outer scope of mandatory joinder, and, by themselves, the terms
“persons” or “parties in interest” or persons “affected” conveyed no
information about how to draw that line. Courts’ attempts at
formulating line-drawing standards were, as commentators both
132. Poore, 2 Atk. at 515-16, 26 Eng. Rep. at 710.
133. See Joy v. Wirtz, 13 F. Cas. 1172 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 7554) (Washington, J.) (“[I]f
a decree can be made without affecting the rights of a person not made a party ... reason, as
well as adjudged cases, will warrant the court in proceeding without him.”); Anonymous,
1 Ves. Jun. 29, 29, 30 Eng. Rep. 215, 215 (Ch. 1789) (“All parties having an apparent right ...
must be brought into Court, before the Court will do any thing, which may affect their right.”).
134. MITFORD, supra note 130, at 39; see also 1 HARRISON, supra note 80, at 33 (discussing
application of the necessary parties rule in cases in which “parties and not parties are equally
affected” by the prayer for relief); 1 JACOB, supra note 131, at 141 (noting rule that party-
plaintiffs must “bring all Parties [in interest] who may be affected before the Court”).
135. See, e.g., Sherrit v. Birch, 3 Bro. C.C. 229, 229, 29 Eng. Rep. 505, 505 (Ch. 1791)
(“[A]lthough the interest was upon such a remote contingency ... [interested persons] must be
made parties.”); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at 442 (“This bill must call all necessary
parties, however remotely concerned in interest.”).
136. See GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY
159 (1758) (explaining that the necessary parties rule requires, at a minimum, joinder “where
the party which is wanting ... may controvert the plaintiff’s very right to the demand in
question”). That risk was considered particularly acute when the relief requested by the
plaintiff would require the absent person to perform some affirmative act. See, e.g., Fell v.
Brown, 2 Bro. C.C. 276, 278, 29 Eng. Rep. 151, 153 (Ch. 1787) (noting a distinction between
active and passive parties in interest for purposes of mandatory joinder).
2009] A NEW LOOK AT THE DIVERSITY CLAUSE 1151
before and after the Constitution’s ratification complained, “vague,”
“indefinite,” and “not eas[ily] reduced to general principles or
grounds.”137
This distinction, in turn, has two implications for the scope of
diversity jurisdiction: First, if Article III uses controversy to mean
prelitigative dispute as well as “suit,” the term is flexible enough to
allow courts to test subject matter jurisdiction under the Diversity
Clause based on the citizenship of persons who were, as Hamilton
said, “parties in interest”—that is, those who are “interested in,”
“concerned in,” or “affected” by the underlying dispute that gives
rise to the suit.138
Second, if that is the correct reading of controversy, the outer
scope of subject matter jurisdiction under Article III is vague,
requiring either judicial or legislative definition of the degree of
interest in a suit that triggers federal subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING OF “CONTROVERSY”
Which sense of “controversy” appears in Article III? The Diversity
Clause, considered in isolation, doesn’t give us any clues. But
intratextual evidence in the surrounding clauses, together with
supporting evidence in the drafting history and ratification debates,
compels the conclusion that “controversy” means suit and suit alone. 
Section A takes on the intratextual evidence. I start by reviewing
the structure of Article III, which reveals that Article III “controver-
sies” are a subset of Article III “cases.” I then show that Article III
uses “cases” to mean suits. Because “controversies” are a kind of
“case,” and “cases” are suits, only one of the conventional meanings
of the term “controversy”—“suits”—is consistent with Article III’s
text and structure. 
Of course, the text is a “lens whose reading must be checked
against readings generated by other lenses,”139 including evidence
of preratification readings drawn from Article III’s drafting history
137. CALVERT, supra note 73, at 4-7 (discussing the interests in a suit that are sufficient
to qualify persons for joinder); 3 RICHARD WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 370 (London, Payne 1793) [hereinafter 3 WOODDESON] (same). 
138. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
139. Amar, supra note 12, at 801.
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and the subsequent ratification debates.140 In Section B, I examine
whether preratification interpretations of Article III during the
Constitutional Convention and ratification debates reinforce the
intratextual inferences. They do.
In Section C, I will summarize the implications of this evidence
for the scope of diversity jurisdiction. 
A. Textual Evidence
Below, Subsection 1 shows that Article III “controversies” are a
kind of, or subset of, “cases.” Subsection 2 shows that “case” was
conventionally used in the sense of “suit” and “dispute.” To figure
out the sense in which Article III uses “case,” we must take a close
look at the text of Article III. Subsection 3 undertakes that exami-
nation. As I show, both the Article III Jury Trial and Original
Jurisdiction Clauses provide powerful intratextual evidence that
“case” is used to mean “suit,” not prelitigative dispute, throughout
Article III, thereby eliminating “dispute” as a possible meaning of
the narrower term “controversy.” 
1. Article III “Controversies” Are a Kind of “Case” 
Article III, section 2 begins, of course, by enumerating the nine
Heads of Jurisdiction. Three of these Heads are denominated with
the word “cases.” The other six Heads, including the Diversity
Clause, are denominated with the word “controversy.”141 This
jurisdictional menu is followed by the Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction Clauses. The former grants the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction over “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, public Ministers
and Consuls” (the Ambassadors Subclause) and “those in which a
State shall be Party” (the State-Party Subclause).142 The latter
provides that in “all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,” with exceptions deter-
mined by Congress.143
140. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
141. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
142. Id. cl. 2.
143. Id.
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This structure requires us to interpret an Article III case as a
broader term than an Article III controversy. To see why, imagine
that “case,” as the word is used in the Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction Clauses and in the preceding jurisdictional menu,
overlaps with, but is narrower than, the meaning of “controversy.”
If that reading were correct, the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause
would authorize the Supreme Court to exercise appellate juris-
diction over only, at most, a mysterious subset of “controversies” in
the jurisdictional menu. Rather than construe Article III in a way
that creates this puzzling gap (which is particularly problematic
given that the Exceptions Clause authorizes exceptions to, but not
supplementation of, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction),144
the unanimous view is that (1) the word “case” subsumes the word
“controversy,” and (2) that the reference to “cases” in the Original
Jurisdiction and Appellate Jurisdiction Clauses refers back to
both “cases” and “controversies” enumerated in the jurisdictional
menu.145
That means, in turn, that the relationship between “case” and
“controversy” is that suggested by the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals’s 1782 decision in Commonwealth v. Caton and reflected in
common usage of the time: that is, a “controversy” is a “civil” case,
while “case” is a broader umbrella term for both civil and criminal
matters.146 This relationship between the two words is the only way
to make sense of the Original or Appellate Jurisdiction Clauses in
144. Cf. Amar, supra note 12, at 764-65 (“[T]he fact that the Original Jurisdiction Clause
does not contain augmentation wording symmetric to the exception wording of the Appellate
Jurisdiction Clause elegantly buttresses Marshall’s conclusion that Congress has no power
to add to the Court’s original docket.”).
145. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM
1829-61,1863 n.71 (2005) (“[S]urely ‘cases’ is not the narrower term.”); Martin H. Redish, Text,
Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633, 1640
n.28 (1990) (“No one, to my knowledge, has suggested that the Supreme Court lacks
constitutional authority to review controversies to which the United States shall be a party,
simply because article III confines its appellate authority to the review of ‘all the other Cases
before mentioned.’”).
146. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Caton, 5 Va. (4 Call) 5, 15 (1782), discussed further infra
notes 188-202 and accompanying text; William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy”
Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263, 266-67
(1990); John Harrison, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and
the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 221-30 (1997); see also Nelson, supra note 86,
at 1586; James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-
Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 607-08 (1994).
1154 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1113
a fashion consistent with contemporary uses of either term: both
Clauses’ references to “cases” encompass the “controversy”-denomi-
nated as well as the “case”-denominated Heads of Jurisdiction
because “controversies” are simply a special kind of “case.”147
The upshot: Article III’s structure requires us to interpret “case”
to be at least as broad a term as “controversy.” If “case” means
“suit”—and that is something we have yet to determine—con-
troversy cannot be interpreted more broadly to include disputes that
precede a suit. Rather, a controversy must be a special kind of suit
(that is, a civil suit).
2. The Conventional Eighteenth-Century Meanings of “Case”
What then was the conventional meaning of “case”? The word was
most commonly used in the sense of “suit”—a use reflected in
eighteenth-century dictionaries, treatises and cases,148 and in pre-
colonial procedural and jurisdictional statutes.149 “Case,” however,
was also sometimes used, albeit more rarely, to refer to prelitigative
legal disputes out of which subsequent suits arose, usage evidenced
by a few cases and some treatises.150 As a result, the range of con-
ventional meaning of the term “case” does not, by itself, foreclose the
possibility that an Article III controversy means dispute as well as
suit. 
147. Harrison, supra note 146, at 249.
148. For uses of the word case to refer to suits, legal proceedings, or actions in reported
cases of the period, see, for example, Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 U.S. 467, 467-71 (Pa. 1798)
(discussing whether the case was a suit of a civil nature or an action of a criminal nature);
Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. 20, 88 (1 Va. Cas. 1793) (referring interchangeably to “civil cases”
and “civil proceedings”); id. at 47 (referring to criminal cases as a setting “in” which a jury
trial takes place—that is, a lawsuit); Barrington v. The King, 3 T.R. 499, 503, 100 Eng. Rep.
699, 701 (K.B. 1789) (Buller, J.) (referring interchangeably to procedures that apply in “civil
cases” and “civil proceedings”). For a post-Framing dictionary that reflects the usage that had
grown up by the end of the eighteenth century, see 1 JOHN BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 1, 425,
436 (8th ed. 1914) (1839) (treating “case,” “cause,” and “suit or action” as synonyms).
149. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
150. For an example of the use of “case” in this way, see Ford v. Potts, 6 N.J.L. 388, 393
(1797) (noting that statute “is chiefly confined to cases where no suit is actually depending,
and seems intended to put such disputes on the same footing as if there had been a suit
commenced”); cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the
Dual Function of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 480 (1994) (arguing that “case”
referred to the legal “question” or legal dispute that transcended the interests of the actual
litigants and collecting authorities).
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It is tempting at this juncture to once again turn to the advisory
opinion rule—which limits federal courts to deciding questions in “a
proper lawsuit involving proper parties”151—to eliminate prelit-
igative “dispute” as a candidate for the meaning of the Article III
case. However, doing so again ignores that the advisory opinion rule
only tells courts how to construe the “case” requirement for purposes
of deciding which questions they may reach, but does not foreclose
construing the term more broadly for other purposes. For example,
the Original Jurisdiction Clause grants the Supreme Court
jurisdiction over cases in which states are party.152 If Article III uses
“case” in a way that encompasses both prelitigative disputes and
suits, the Court could flexibly construe “case” to mean disputes for
purposes of establishing original jurisdiction of a suit—that is, when
states are parties in interest to the dispute out of which the suit
arises—while confining itself to actually deciding the questions
presented in the litigated portion of the dispute.153
We therefore need to push beyond the advisory opinion rule, and
look for additional, firmer evidence in Article III’s text that ex-
cludes “dispute” as a plausible meaning of the Article III “case” and,
therefore, “controversy.” 
3. Intratextual Evidence That “Cases” (and “Controversies”) Are
Suits: The Article III Jury Trial Clause and the Original     
Jurisdiction Clause
The additional evidence is found in two clauses—the Article III
Jury Trial Clause and Original Jurisdiction Clause—which strongly
suggest that Article III uses “case” to mean “suit,” not dispute. The
latter clause, in particular, is a rich intratextual interpretive key,
which provides powerful evidence about the meaning of “case”
throughout Article III. 
First, if “case” includes disputes preceding a lawsuit, then the
Article III Jury Trial Clause, which provides that “the trial of all
crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury,”154 would
151. Paulsen, supra note 65, at 302-03.
152. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
153. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (making the same point with respect to the
controversy requirement).
154. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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make no sense. A “trial by jury” does not occur “in” a dispute that
precedes a criminal proceeding; it occurs in the proceeding itself.
“Cases,” here, obviously means a formal criminal proceeding, not a
criminal dispute or criminal law question that precedes that
proceeding.
Reading “case” to mean disputes that precede lawsuits is also a
poor fit with the Original Jurisdiction Clause—a point made by
Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn.155 Marshall, however, wrongly
insinuated that the Clause cannot be interpreted to use “case” in
this way. But, even so, Marshall’s instincts were correct: The best
interpretation of “cases” in this Clause is “suits,” because (1) that
interpretation does the best job of giving the terms “affecting” and
“party” a distinct legal effect, and (2) that interpretation also makes
the best sense of the Clause in light of the larger political context in
which Article III was ratified. 
To see why Marshall’s is the best reading, let’s start by taking a
diametrically opposite view of the word “case” than Marshall, by
assuming “cases” here means “a dispute preceding a lawsuit,” as
well as a “suit.” If so, the Clause, at its broadest, refers to “disputes
affecting ambassadors” and disputes “in which states are party.” In
that case, both the Ambassadors Subclause and the State-Party
Subclause, at their broadest, trigger original jurisdiction when
ambassadors or states are interested in the dispute that gives rise
to a suit. As we have seen, “affecting” was used to mean “interested”
in the prelitigative dispute. So was the term “party.” Persons
“interested” in the dispute that preceded a lawsuit were “parties” to
the dispute or “parties in interest.”156
In that case, the carefully chosen words in the Ambassadors and
State-Party Subclauses would not have an obviously distinct legal
155. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 854-55 (1824) (“In the case of
foreign ministers it was intended, for reasons which all comprehend, to give the national
Courts jurisdiction over all cases by which they were in any manner affected. In the case of
States ... it was intended to give jurisdiction in those cases only to which they were actual
parties” to “the suit.”).
156. See, e.g., Devit v. College of Dublin, Gilb. Rep. 241, 242, 25 Eng. Rep. 166, 167 (Ch.
1742) (referring to “Parties in Interest” in a dispute about land rights preceding the filing of
any claim); 2 GEOFFREY GILBERT, TWO TREATISES ON THE PROCEEDINGS IN EQUITY: AND THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 1756-58 (referring to a debt “affecting the heir”); 3 WOODDESON,
supra note 137, at 167 (referring to “injuries affecting the plaintiff’s person” and “civil right[s],
affecting our persons or our property”).
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effect. As we have seen, “affected persons” and “parties in interest”
were interchangeable terms of art in the joinder law of the period
and were also indistinguishably vague: they could refer to both
“immediate” and “remote” interests in the dispute157 in ways that
were “not easy to be reduced to general principles or grounds.”158 As
a result, if we interpret case to mean “questions preceding a suit,”
there is no clear basis for distinguishing the reach of either grant of
original jurisdiction: both terms would set indistinguishably vague
boundaries around the scope of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction over “cases” dealing with ambassadors and states. 
Perhaps the Framers used the words “affecting” and “party” to
signal that courts should construe the range of interests that
ambassadors, on the one hand, and states, on the other, have in a
dispute in different ways. The claim is unconvincing because, in this
context, “affecting” and “party” were not distinct concepts—used to
describe persons interested in a dispute, they were synonyms for
“parties in interest.” Yet, even if the Framers implausibly used
synonyms to signal that courts should treat the interests of states
and ambassadors differently, the Clause would remain maddeningly
opaque: Should courts construe “affecting” or “party” to be the
broader term? The law of parties at the time of enactment provides
no answer—both terms were perplexingly vague.
Is there another interpretation that fits conventional usage and
also gives the terms “affecting” and “party” intelligibly distinct legal
effect?159 One possibility is to interpret the term “affecting” to mean
“bound”—as we have seen, the word was sometimes used to refer to
the preclusive effect of a judgment on a party to the suit.160 If
“affecting” is construed to mean “bound,” “case” must mean suit—
one is not bound by a dispute that precedes a lawsuit—and the
phrase “cases ... affecting ambassadors” must mean “suits ... in
which ambassadors have been joined as parties.” 
157. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
159. Cf. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991) (stating that
ambiguity should be resolved in a way that makes “sense rather than nonsense” out of the
corpus juris). 
160. See, e.g., Cuthbert v. Westwood, Gilb. Rep. 230, 230, 25 Eng. Rep. 160, 160 (Ch. 1726)
(“It is not sufficient to make the Land-Owners only, but they should have made the Occupiers,
Parties to the Bill, for a Decree against the Land-Owners could not affect them.”).
1158 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1113
What, then, do we make of the phrase “cases ... in which a state
shall be party”? As we have seen, the framing generation carefully
distinguished between “persons of interest” and “parties to the suit”
and never referred to persons as “parties” in a suit without qualifi-
cation, except when referring to the latter. Accordingly, if “case”
means “suit,” the later reference to “cases ... in which states shall be
party” most naturally refers to “suits in which states are parties to
the suit.” Again, the terms “affecting” and “party” would have no
distinct legal effect.
One last interpretation is possible: Marshall’s. His interpretation
fits conventional uses of both terms. As discussed in detail in the
last Part,161 “affecting” was used to refer to persons who were
interested in the legal questions raised in a suit already before the
court, but who had not been made parties to the suit. And, as we
have seen, “party” was used without qualification when referring to
parties to the suit. If, in turn, “affecting” means “interested in the
suit” and “parties” means “parties to the suit,” the terms also have
a distinct legal effect, by extending the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction much more broadly when litigated cases have diplo-
matic ramifications than in cases involving states. 
Independent of textual coherence, there are good reasons for
interpreting the terms these ways, rooted (1) in the diplomatic
situation of the early United States and the law of ambassadorial
immunity, and (2) in the widespread concern about the geographic
inconvenience of the Supreme Court as a forum for trial. 
First, the early United States, befitting its tenuous position in
the international arena, placed a premium on the maintenance of
good diplomatic relations with other countries.162 The Ambassadors
Subclause, in turn, provides Congress with the requisite “flexibility
in affording exclusive jurisdiction in the [Supreme] Court over the
suits involving foreign representatives and their households most
likely to upset foreign relations.”163
161. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Mattueof ’s Case, 10 Mod. 4, 5, 88 Eng. Rep. 598, 598 (Q.B. 1709) (“The ill
treatment of ambassadors ... may involve the nation in a war.”).
163. Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International
Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits
by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1802 (2004).
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Two examples illustrate the point: First, because the law of
nations afforded the same immunity from suit to embassy personnel
as it did to ambassadors, ambassadors had both practical and legal
interest in judicial interpretations of the scope of immunity afforded
such personnel,164 and indeed, violations of the immunity of
ambassadorial staff caused the early United States its most serious
diplomatic losses of face during the Articles of Confederation
period.165 The term “affecting” ensured that the Supreme Court
would be open to any sensitive suits—including suits in which
ambassadors’ staff, but not ambassadors, were parties—that raised
difficult questions about the proper scope of diplomatic immunity or
other diplomatic rights in which ambassadors might be inter-
ested.166
Second, some eighteenth-century authorities suggested the law
of nations did not immunize ambassadors acting as private market
participants. Parliament, in turn, criminalized any suits against
ambassadors outside the scope of this exception.167 Cautious
litigants seeking to test the scope of ambassadorial immunity but
wary of this criminal provision had the option of bringing suit
against the ambassadors’ jointly liable business partners, not the
ambassador. When the defendants demurred for failure to join the
ambassador as a necessary party, courts could excuse the necessary
164. See, e.g., EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 556-58
(Northampton, Simeon Butler, 4th Am. ed. 1820) (1758); see also Taylor v. Best, 14 C.B. 487,
524, 139 Eng. Rep. 201, 216 (C.C.P. 1854) (noting that the privilege of the ambassador’s
servant “is based on the assumption, that, by the arrest of any of his household retinue, the
personal comfort and state of the ambassador might be affected” and noting that the privilege
traditionally extends to any case in which ambassadors’ rights are “in any way made the
subject of litigation” for the same reason). 
165. William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed
in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 494 (1986) (detailing diplomatic
fallout resulting from an attack on a member of the household of Ambassador Van Berckel of
the Netherlands).
166. Lee, supra note 163, at 1801.
167. See, e.g., 7 Anne, c. 7, § 5 (1710). The statute was held to codify the scope of the
ambassadorial privilege under the law of nations. Barbuit’s Case, Talbot 281, 282-83 & n.1,
25 Eng. Rep. 777, 777-78 & n.1 (Ch. 1737). For authorities suggesting ambassadorial
immunity from domestic jurisdiction did not apply to ambassadors acting as private market
participants, see DE VATTEL, supra note 164, at 552 (suggesting an ambassador can be
compelled, through attachment of his personal property, to answer actions of a commercial
character, because such actions have “no affinity with his functions and character”). 
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party rule if it found that the ambassador was immune from
process,168 and such rulings provided occasions for significant
decisions on the scope of ambassadorial immunity.169
The first Congress also criminalized suits against ambassadors
in cases where ambassadors enjoyed immunity under the law of
nations—ensuring few suits were filed against ambassadors.170 If,
in turn, Article III confined the Supreme Court to hearing cases
brought by or against ambassadors, but not cases where ambassa-
dors were interested, the Court could not exercise exclusive
jurisdiction in necessary party cases where questions about the
scope of ambassadorial immunity would be litigated. The term
“affecting” solves that problem, by giving Congress the flexibility to
grant the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction in any sensitive
cases in which the scope of immunity might be litigated, including
cases in which questions about ambassadorial immunity arose in
the necessary parties context.
Interpreting the State-Party Subclause to refer to parties to the
suit also makes sense in light of widespread concerns that poor
168. The necessary parties rule was subject to an exception where the necessary party was
beyond the reach of process, as where the defendant was overseas, so long as a decree could
be fashioned that would not require binding the parties’ interests. See, e.g., Hazard, supra
note 83, at 1261 (“If the absent party was outside the jurisdiction ... joinder was not
required.”). Ambassadors were considered to reside, as a matter of law, in the dominions of
his sovereign, and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., Mattueof ’s Case,
10 Mod. 4, 5, 88 Eng. Rep. 598, 598 (Q.B. 1709) (“The same fiction of law that makes [the
ambassador] represent the person of his master, makes him ... quasi in the dominions of his
master.”).
169. The ambassadorial privilege was so infrequently litigated that the existence and scope
of a “trader” exception to the privilege under the law of nations was contested well into the
nineteenth century. A mandatory joinder case, in turn, was the occasion for a major mid-
nineteenth century consideration of the exception in Taylor v. Best, 14 C.B. 487, 139 Eng. Rep.
201 (C.C.P. 1854), where an ambassador, a necessary party to a breach of contract action,
resisted the court’s jurisdiction on the ground of ambassadorial immunity. 14 C.B. at 487, 139
Eng. Rep. at 201-02. Chief Justice Jervis’s opinion recognized that the ambassador, even
though acting as a market participant, would have been entitled to the privilege, and that the
ambassador’s joinder therefore might have been excused, but held that the defendant had
waived the privilege by entering a plea. 14 C.B. at 518-20, 139 Eng. Rep. at 213-15 (noting
while the plaintiff was bound to sue all the joint contractors, “the practice has been, not to
stay the proceedings altogether [as a result of the impossibility of joining a privileged party],
but to discharge the party [entitled to the privilege] from custody”); 14 C.B. at 521, 139 Eng.
Rep. at 215 (finding that the defendant had waived the privilege by entering a plea). 
170. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 25, 1 Stat. 112, 117-18; Lee, supra note 163, at 1803 n.162
(noting that the rarity of invocation of the Ambassadors Subclause stems from Congress’s
criminalization of suits against ambassadors).
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litigants could be dragged by wealthy ones to the distant federal
capital for trial. As Akhil Amar notes, “[g]eography preoccupied the
founding generation,” including in its design of the federal court
system.171 Skeptics of the new Constitution feared that trial in the
Supreme Court would prove “geographically onerous,” as it would
“require that litigants, witnesses, and physical evidence be ‘dragged
to the centre.’”172 The fear, indeed, also pervaded postratification
debates concerning whether the Original Jurisdiction Clause
established a maximum ceiling on the Court’s original jurisdiction
or only a constitutional floor.173
In light of fears about the burden of trial in the national capital,
reading the Original Jurisdiction Clause to limit jurisdiction to
cases in which states actually appeared as parties makes eminent
good sense. As Marshall noted in Osborn, states’ “immediate or
remote interests [are] mixed up with a multitude of cases,” as they
“might be affected in an almost infinite variety of ways.”174 If, in
turn, the Court’s original jurisdiction extended to any case in which
a state were interested, the scope of matters in which litigants,
witnesses, and evidence might be “dragged to the centre” “would be
multiplied to a most oppressive degree.”175 Limiting jurisdiction to
the class of suits in which states were actually parties, by contrast,
naturally cabined the threat posed by the “geographic onus” of trial
in the Supreme Court. 
The upshot: giving distinct meaning to all of the terms of the
Original Jurisdiction Clause in a way that makes the best sense of
the Ambassadors and State-Party Subclauses requires interpreting
“affecting” to refer to persons interested or concerned in a suit,
“party” to refer to the persons joined in the suit, and “case” to refer
to the suit itself.176
171. Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 469, 473 (1989).
172. Id. at 472-73.
173. Id. at 474-75.
174. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 855 (1824).
175. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
[hereinafter FARRAND] (James Madison).
176. One might argue that perhaps the meaning of “case” in the Original Jurisdiction
Clause changes within the Clause. That is, perhaps case refers to prelitigative disputes in
which ambassadors are interested and, later in the same Clause, switches to mean litigated
actions in which states are made a party through formal process. The composition of the
Original Jurisdiction Clause, however, cuts against that interpretation: the word “cases” is
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With that understanding in hand, the Original Jurisdiction
Clause, together with the Article III Jury Trial Clause, creates an
intratextual presumption in favor of interpreting the term “case” to
mean “suits” throughout Article III’s jurisdictional menu.177 As we
have seen, that presumption also carries over to the word “contro-
versy” because the State-Party Subclause178 clearly refers back to,
at a minimum, the controversies between states and others (i.e.,
“between two or more States,” et al.) enumerated in the preceding
jurisdictional menu,179 underscoring that meaning of “case” in the
Original Jurisdiction Clause is evidence of the meaning of “contro-
versy,” as well.180
used as the unitary object of the Original Jurisdiction Clause, which to ordinary users of
language indicates that the meaning of “cases” is consistent throughout the Clause. The
inference is supported, as well, by the use of the word “those” to refer back to “cases” when
the Clause turns from ambassadorial cases to state-party cases; “those” is used here,
consistently with its use in other parts of the Constitution, to refer back to an antecedent
word when using that word in the same generic sense as its antecedent use.
For example, Article I, section 2 provides: “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Although this textual use of “those” occurs in an odious Article I context, it is consistent with
the implication for the parallel use of the term in the Original Jurisdiction Clause: in Article
I, the term “free persons” is used to mean nonslaves; “including those bound to a service for
a term of years” simultaneously confirms that generic meaning of “free person” and
underscores that “those” refers to the antecedent term “free person” in a way that is
consistent with its generic sense in the earlier subclause. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9
(“[N]o preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one
state over those of another.”). This argument is not inconsistent with reading “those cases”
to refer to “civil cases” in the State-Party Subclause, while interpreting “all cases” in the
Ambassadors Subclause to refer to criminal and civil proceedings. In Article I, section 2,
“those” is also used to refer to a subset of the generic class of things embraced by the word i.e.,
a subset of “nonslaves,” “those” who are “bound to service for a term of years.”
177. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
178. Id.
179. Id. cl. 1.
180. The Original Jurisdiction Clause also, of course, suggests that Article III defines
controversies as disputes between “parties.” The orthodox “categorical” understanding of the
State-Party Subclause assumes the Subclause refers to the entire three enumerated
categories of “controversies” between states and others (i.e., “between a State and Citizens of
another State,” et cetera). By identifying the entire categories of controversies “between”
states and others as categories in which states are parties, the inference follows that the word
“between” in other grants of jurisdiction refers to parties to the suit as well.
The inference that all grants of jurisdiction “between” various persons refer to parties is
also supported by the records of the Committee of Detail: James Wilson’s draft of the judiciary
articles originally provided that the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction in cases
2009] A NEW LOOK AT THE DIVERSITY CLAUSE 1163
One might imagine a counterargument that proceeded along the
following lines: (1) perhaps the terms “case” and “controversy,” in
the jurisdictional menu, are used in a more general sense to refer to
suits and disputes, while (2) the State-Party Subclause uses the
word “case” to mean suits only. That reading, however, flies against
the intratextual presumption that words are used in the same way
throughout the text. If “case” is used to mean “suits” in the State-
Party Subclause, the presumption arises that it is used the same
way elsewhere. The presumption that “cases” means “suits” in the
jurisdictional menu is also reinforced by the Ambassadors Sub-
clause, which grants original jurisdiction over “all” cases in which
states are ambassadors.181 Because the evidence suggests that the
word “case” means “suits” in the Ambassadors Subclause, the word
“all” underscores that when “case” is used to define the “affecting
Ambassadors” Head of Jurisdiction in the preceding jurisdictional
menu, “suit” cashes out the meaning of “case” there, as well. 
That presumption is also reinforced by the Appellate Jurisdiction
Clause, which provides that the Supreme Court exercises appellate
jurisdiction in “all the other Cases before mentioned.” By noting that
it deals with the “other” cases “before mentioned,” the Appellate
Jurisdiction Clause implies that it and the Original Jurisdiction
Clause (the only “other” clause that refers back to the jurisdictional
menu) refer to the “before mentioned” cases in the jurisdictional
menu. One does not, in turn, claim to be using a word in a “before
mentioned” sense if the word is, in fact, being used in a narrower,
different sense than its previous mentioned uses. Because the
textual evidence suggests “case” means suit in both the Original
Jurisdiction Clause and the jurisdictional menu, that is the broadest
available interpretation of the word “controversy,” as well. 
One might also imagine a final, additional counterargument along
the following lines: Rather than drafting the jurisdictional menu in
“in which a State shall be one of the Parties.” 2 FARRAND, supra note 175, at 163, 173 (quoting
Wilson’s notations). The phrase was later edited by John Rutledge to read “in which a State
shall be a Party.” Id. (quoting Rutledge’s notations). See id. at 163-75. The change, while
likely stylistic, also could have been intended to ensure that the grant of original jurisdiction
would extend to controversies “between States,” and would not be narrowly construed to reach
cases in which a State was only “one” of the parties to the suit. The uncorrected version
underscores that all grants of jurisdiction “between” certain categories of persons were
understood to refer to suits between “parties.”
181. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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an extremely precise way—by providing, say, that jurisdiction
extends to “suits where citizens of different states shall be parties
to the suit”—the jurisdictional menu defines jurisdiction in an
economical and abstract way by providing only that jurisdiction
extends to “[controversies] between Citizens of different States.”
Isn’t the brevity and abstraction of Article III’s text powerful
evidence that we should interpret the terms broadly rather than
narrowly?
The objection, in fact, points out the importance of intratextual
interpretation: We must be sensitive to the possibility that a term,
like the word “controversy,” was used in lieu of wordy and detailed
elaborations because the conventional meaning of the term, read in
context, imported the same meaning as the wordy elaboration, but
in an obvious, economical way to contemporary readers. Clause-
bound interpretation risks blinding us to this possibility. Holistic
interpretation, by contrast, helps correct the bias because the use of
the term across clauses can reveal that the term was shorthand for
a set of technical limits that aren’t apparent on the face of any
individual clause. 
B. Preratification Interpretations of Cases and Controversies
Of course, we must check the intratextual inferences against
“other lenses.”182 Below I consider the preratification interpretations
of the terms “case” and “controversy” in both colonial precursors to
Article III as well as Article III as ratified. Although discussion of
Article III was notoriously sparse, the interpretations advanced
throughout the drafting and ratification records support interpret-
ing cases and controversies at a narrow level of generality to mean
suits between parties to the suit: Indeed, I have not found any
evidence that any contemporary readers understood Article III to
use either term to encompass prelitigative disputes for purposes of
establishing subject matter jurisdiction. 
First, colonial and pre-Framing era state jurisdictional stat-
utes—the closest analogues to Article III—employed both terms as
interchangeable synonyms for lawsuit. I’ve examined jurisdictional
and procedural provisions using “case” or “controversy” in Virginia
182. Amar, supra note 12, at 801; see also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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statutes regulating state courts between 1700 and 1789 and have
found no jurisdictional grant or regulation of court process that,
considered in context, unambiguously used the words to mean
prelitigative dispute, and twelve jurisdictional and procedural
statutes that clearly used the words as synonyms for lawsuit or
legal proceeding.183
Representative examples of this latter usage of “case” include a
1781 Virginia statute incorporating the town of Fredericksburg,
providing that 
in civil cases, the [local] court of hustings shall not have jurisdic-
tion where the demand shall exceed one thousand pounds of crop
tobacco, or the value thereof in money at the time of entering the
action, unless both parties shall be inhabitants of the town, at
the time of suing out the first process in the suit.184
Here, the statute uses the words “action” and “suit” to refer to
individual instances of “civil cases.” Given the context, interpreting
“cases” to mean questions that precede a lawsuit makes no sense,
because the statute hinges jurisdiction over such “cases” on the
“demand” made “at the time of entering the action.” A similar
interpretation of “controversy” follows from a 1784 Virginia statute
incorporating the Episcopal Church, which granted the Church the
power to “sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be
answered unto, defend and be defended, in all suits, controversies,
causes, actions, matters, and things, in any court or courts of law or
equity whatsoever.”185 Here, employing a belt-and-suspenders
redundancy common in legal drafting of the period,186 the word
183. See infra note 187 (collecting examples).
184. Act of Nov. 1781, ch. I, reprinted in 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION
OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR
1619, at 439, 441 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va., George Cochran 1822)
[hereinafter 10 LAWS OF VIRGINIA].
185. Act of Oct. 1784, ch. XLIX, reprinted in 11 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN
THE YEAR 1619, at 532, 533 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va., George Cochran
1823) [hereinafter 11 LAWS OF VIRGINIA].
186. Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinions Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 648-50
(1996) (noting constitutional redundancies must be interpreted in “commonsensical” fashion,
because eighteenth-century statutory drafting sometimes used redundancy out of an
abundance of “caution”).
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“controversy,” together with the words “suit,” “cause,” and “action,”
refers to a formal legal proceeding, not a question preceding a
lawsuit—an inference required by the statute’s treatment of
“controversies” as settings for procedural steps (pleading, answers,
and defenses) that occur only in lawsuits.187
187. For other examples of the use of the word case in contexts in which its legal
connotation can only be “lawsuit” or legal “proceeding,” see Act of Oct. 1785, ch. XVII,
reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA,
FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 50, 54 (William Waller
Hening ed., Richmond, Va., George Cochran 1823) (“[I]n all cases to trial in pursuance of the
jurisdiction settled by this compact, citizens of either state shall attend as witnesses in the
other, upon a summons from any court, or magistrate, having jurisdiction, being served by a
proper officer of the county where such citizen shall reside.”); Act of May 1782, ch. XXV,
reprinted in 11 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 185, at 45, 48 (“[T]he said court shall not hear
and determine any penal case, unless it be for a breach of laws of the corporation, the penalty
whereof does not exceed forty shillings, or two hundred pounds of crop tobacco, nor of any
action beyond the value of one hundred pounds.”); Act of May 1779, ch. XXII, reprinted in 10
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 184, at 89, 91 (granting the court of appeals jurisdiction “in
such cases as shall be removed before them by adjournment from the other courts before
mentioned”); id. ch. XXIV, at 93, 96 (“The auditors shall grant certificates to all witnesses,
veniremen, and sheriffs, for their attendance in criminal cases, and shall allow them in such
certificates two shillings per mile for travelling, and four pounds per day for their attendance,
besides ferriages (instead of the allowances heretofore established by law) which the treasurer
is directed to pay for their attendance at the general court.”); Act of Oct. 1710, ch. XI,
reprinted in 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA,
FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 504, 511 (William Waller
Hening ed., Philadelphia, Pa., Thomas Desilver 1823) (“[I]n all Cases where the Title or
Bounds of any Estate in Land is determined, the Pleadings shall be all in writing, and shall
be ent[e]red at large, with the Judgment thereupon, in particular Books set apart for that
purpose only.”).
For other examples of statutes using “controversy” in a context in which its connotation can
only mean “lawsuit,” see Act of Oct. 1778, ch. XII, reprinted in 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE;
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 522, 523 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va., J.
& G. Cochran 1821) [hereinafter 9 LAWS OF VIRGINIA] (“The said court [of appeals] shall have
power to hear and finally determine all suits and controversies whatsoever which shall be
brought before them by petition and appeal from the high court of chancery, or court of
admiralty, or by writ of errour sued out to correct any judgment of the general court, or which
shall be adjourned thither from either of the said courts, on account of difficulty.”); Act of Oct.
1748, ch. VI, art. XXIX, reprinted in 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at
467, 488 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va., The Franklin Press 1819) (“[N]othing
in this act contained shall extend to any suits or controversies now depending in, or
returnable to the general court.”); id. ch. VII, at 489, 491 (“[T]he justices may adjourn from
day to day, until all causes and controversies, then depending before them, shall be heard and
determined.”); Act of Oct. 1748, ch. LIX, reprinted in 6 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN
THE YEAR 1619, at 201, 202 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va., The Franklin Press
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This statutory usage of case or controversy, in turn, received
judicial confirmation in Commonwealth v. Caton,188 the most au-
thoritative pre-Framing judicial interpretation of these terms in a
state jurisdictional statute. Caton, a famed pre-Marbury judicial
endorsement of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative
acts, required Virginia’s Supreme Court of Appeals to determine
whether Virginia’s legislature had properly exercised its power to
pardon three men convicted of treason.189 The Virginia “general
court” had “adjourned,” or referred, the case to the Supreme Court
of Appeals under a statutory provision that allowed the general
court to do so in cases raising “new and difficult” legal questions.190
However, the referral raised a preliminary jurisdictional question:
did the legislature grant the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction
over criminal proceedings?191 The answer turned on the meaning of
the words “case” and “controversy.” Specifically, the jurisdictional
statutes provided that the Court of Appeals (1) “shall have jurisdic-
tion ... in suits originating there and adjourned thither for trials by
virtue of any statute”;192 (2) “[in] all suits and controversies ... which
shall be brought before them by petition and appeal from ... any
judgment of the general court”;193 and (3) “in such cases as shall be
removed before them by adjournment from the other courts before
mentioned, when questions ... new and difficult occur.”194
1819) (“That the said courts of the several counties aforesaid shall begin upon the respective
days herein before appointed, and shall continue to be held from day to day, exclusive of
Sundays, until all causes and controversies then depending before the said courts,
respectively brought, by attachment, or petition, or in which any issue is to be tried, writ of
inquiry to be executed, special verdict, case agreed, or demurrer to be argued, or any cause
set down for hearing, or argument in chancery, shall be heard and determined.”); Act of May
1732, ch. X, reprinted in 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 340 (William
Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va., The Franklin Press 1820) (“An Act to revive and continue
certain parts of an Act, for ascertaining the fees of certain officers; and for better settling the
fees of county court clerks, and sheriffs; and of attorneys, in causes depending in the county
courts, to be allowed in the bill of costs; and for settling the fee for summoning vitnesses, in
controversies depending before the Governor and Council.”). 
188. 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
189. Id. at 5 (reporters’ note).
190. Id.
191. See id. at 6-7.
192. Act of May 1779, ch. XXII, reprinted in 10 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 184, at 89-90.
193. Act of Oct. 1778, ch. XII, reprinted in 9 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 187, at 522, 533.
194. Act of May 1779, ch. XXII, reprinted in 10 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 184, at 89,
91.
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The state argued that the terms “controversy” and “case” referred
to privately initiated civil lawsuits, rather than publicly initi-
ated criminal prosecutions.195 Of the three reported opinions—by
Chancellors George Wythe, Edmund Pendleton, and John Blair196—
Pendleton’s alone addressed the meaning of the jurisdictional
statutes in detail.197 He concluded that the term “suit” as well as the
term “controversies” are synonyms for privately initiated lawsuits,
while the “more general” term “cases” referred to both private suits
as well as public criminal prosecutions.198 “Controversies,” he said,
refers to civil disputes between “litigant parties.”199 The “more
general” word “case,” he continued, includes “controversies” so
defined, as well as criminal suits.200
Pendleton’s interpretation, moreover, makes sense of the stat-
utes’ text. The text refers to “controversies” which are adjourned
“by petition,” by appeal, or by “writ of erro[r]”201—indicating that
“controversy” is used to refer to different stages of a pending or filed
legal suit. Similarly, the statute assumes that legal “questions”
“occur” in a “case”202—indicating that “case” is not simply the
questions in the case, but the formal setting, including either a
lawsuit or a criminal prosecution, in which such questions arise. 
The settled interpretation of colonial statutes, in turn, framed
the drafting of the Constitution’s judiciary articles. The text of
Article III did not take its final form until after the Committee of
Detail (a five member committee composed of James Wilson,
195. See Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 9 (Wythe, J.) (statement of questions presented); id. at 14-
15 (Pendleton, President).
196. A report of the case was not published until 1827, by Daniel Call. See Suzanna Sherry,
The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1143 n.90 (1987). Relying on
Chancellor Pendleton’s notes of the case, Pendleton’s biographer, David Mays, supports the
accuracy of Call’s reporting. Id. (citing DAVID JOHN MAYS, 2 EDMUND PENDLETON 1721-1803:
A BIOGRAPHY 187-202 (1952)); see also William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners
and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491, 532 (1994) (“[W]here Call’s account
is consistent with, but more detailed than, Pendleton’s—as is the case with his report of
Wythe’s opinion—Call’s report is presumably accurate.”).
197. See Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 14-16 (Pendleton, President). Wythe’s reported opinion
deals with the question in a cursory fashion. See id. at 9 (Wythe, J.). 
198. Id. at 14-16 (Pendleton, President).
199. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 14-15.
201. 9 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 187, at 522-23.
202. Act of May 1779, ch. XXII, reprinted in 10 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 184, at 89,
91.
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Edmund Randolph, John Rutledge, Oliver Ellsworth, and Nathaniel
Gorham)203 reported its draft of the Constitution to the Committee
of the Whole on August 6, 1787.204 Edmund Randolph, who argued
Commonwealth v. Caton for the State of Virginia as its attorney
general,205 and James Wilson took the lead on drafting.206
Before the Committee took up the drafting oar, however, the
Committee of the Whole had framed the goals of the judiciary article
broadly, leaving the Committee of Detail the task of reducing these
principles to concrete legal language.207 The New Jersey plan, for
example, stated that jurisdiction should extend to “cases in which
foreigners may be interested”;208 and the Virginia plan stated that
jurisdiction should extend to “cases in which foreigners or citizens
of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested.”209
The Committee of the Whole’s final resolution on the judiciary
articles framed the goal even more broadly: it tasked the Committee
with producing a judiciary article that would extend jurisdiction to
“questions which involve the national peace and harmony.”210
One might be tempted to view these resolutions as evidence that
“case” and “controversy” are broad enough to encompass preliti-
gative questions in which persons in different states and the like are
interested, for purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.
The evidence, however, tends to cut the other way. First, Edmund
Randolph’s initial draft of the judiciary article provided that “[t]he
jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend ... to such other
cases, as the national legislature may assign, as involving the
national peace and harmony ... in disputes between the citizens of
different states ... and in disputes, in which subjects or citizens of
other countries are concerned.”211 Here, by referring to “cases ... in
disputes,” the draft distinguishes “cases” from the larger dispute out
of which it arises—suggesting “cases” is used in the sense of “suit,”
203. MELVYN R. DURCHSLAG, STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 9 (Jack Stark ed., 2002).
204. 2 FARRAND, supra note 175, at 176.
205. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 6.
206. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 175, at 163, 172-73.
207. DURCHSLAG, supra note 203, at 9.
208. 1 FARRAND, supra note 175, at 244.
209. Id. at 22.
210. Id. at 231, 237; see also 2 id. at 46.
211. 2 id. at 146-47 (emphasis omitted).
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not “dispute preceding the suit.” Note, as well, that the final draft
jettisoned the jurisdictional grant over “cases ... in which subjects or
citizens of other countries are concerned,” replacing it with contro-
versies “between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.” The final draft also jettisoned all other
references to jurisdiction over “disputes” or “questions” in which
various persons are vaguely “interested.”
By eliminating language that plainly would have supported a
broad reading of Article III, the drafting history, if it has any
interpretive import, cuts in favor, not against, the independent
textual inference that Article III uses “case” and “controversy” as
narrow terms of art. The Framers, after all, knew how to authorize
jurisdiction based on the identity of persons interested in the
prelitigative dispute, but chose not to do so. 
And, indeed, James Wilson’s later comments on the Committee’s
work suggest this is the correct inference: he noted that the
Committee converted the broad resolutions into specific enumera-
tions in order “to lessen or remove the difficulty arising from
discretionary construction” of the Constitution’s power-conferring
grants.212
After the Committee reported its work, interpretations continued
to point in the same direction—either explicitly acknowledging, or
consistent with, use of “case” and “controversy” to mean “suit.” For
example, on August 30, 1787, Governour Morris proposed an
amendment to the Committee of the Whole granting Congress the
power to make rules and regulations governing the territories.213
Luther Martin moved to amend Morris’s proposal by adding the
212. James Wilson, Speech Delivered on the 26th November, 1787, in the Convention of
Pennsylvania (Nov. 26, 1787), in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 759, 764 (Robert Green
McCloskey ed., 1967) [hereinafter Convention of Pennsylvania]. Wilson made that comment
while explaining to the Pennsylvania ratification convention why the Committee had replaced
a similarly broad resolution—that the national legislature should be competent “to legislate
in all Cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States
are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be
interrupted,” 2 FARRAND, supra note 175, at 131-32—with the enumeration of legislative
powers in Article I, Section 8. Convention of Pennsylvania, supra, at 764-65. Given the
parallel generality of the resolutions on Congress’s and the judiciary’s powers, Wilson’s
explanation of the Committee’s use of enumeration in Article I sheds light on the parallel use
of enumeration of specific cases and controversies in Article III. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl,
Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 148.
213. 2 FARRAND, supra note 175, at 466. 
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following clause: “But all such claims may be examined into &
decided upon by the supreme Court of the U[nited] States.”214
Morris, joined by a majority of delegates, objected that the amend-
ment was “unnecessary as all suits to which the U[nited] S[tates]
are parties are already to be decided by the Supreme Court.”215
Because the then-current draft of the Heads of Jurisdiction provided
that the judicial power extends to “controversies ... to which the
United States shall be a Party,”216 Morris’s objection treats “contro-
versies” and “suits” as synonyms.217
After the Convention reported its draft to the states, various
ratifying conventions reported amendments that evidenced a similar
understanding of “case” and “controversy.” New Hampshire, for
example, proposed amending the draft to include a proviso that “all
common-law cases between citizens of different states shall be
commenced in the common-law courts of the respective states.”218 By
referring to the “commence[ment]” of “cases” in “court,” the text uses
case to mean “suits” rather than questions preceding a suit.219
214. Id.
215. Id. (emphasis added). 
216. Id. at 423 (recording a motion to add words “to which the United States shall be a
party” after the word “controversies” passed on August 27, 1787).
217. Similarly, a draft circulated either toward the end of the Committee of Details’s
drafting process or after the Committee had reported its final draft provides, like the final
version of Article III, that federal jurisdiction shall extend “to controversies ... between
citizens of the same State claiming lands of different States,” but also provides, in its version
of the Original Jurisdiction Clause, that in “suits between persons claiming lands under
grants of different States the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.” Id. at 432-33.
By referring to the “controversies” involving land grants of different states as “suits,” the draft
treats the terms as synonyms.
218. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERALCONSTITUTION 326 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’SDEBATES]. 
219. See, e.g., JOSEPH HARRISON, THE ACCOMPLISH’D PRACTISER IN THE HIGH COURT OF
CHANCERY 73 (1st Am. ed. 1807) (chapter on “commencement of suits”); 3 WOODDESON, supra
note 137, at 367 (referring to the “commencement of a suit” in equity). 
Virginia’s delegates proposed an amendment, which in the illustrative version introduced
in Virginia, provided “that the judicial power shall extend to no case where the cause of action
shall have originated before the ratification of this Constitution, except in suits for debts due
to the United States.” 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 218, at 530 (proposal of George Mason
at Virginia ratifying convention). By treating “suits for debts due to the United States” as an
exception to the general rule that the judicial power shall extend to “cases,” the text treats
cases and lawsuits as synonyms. See also id. at 530 (remarks of George Mason) (referring to
the amendment’s various exceptions from the bar on retroactive jurisdiction, including “suits”
for debts owed the United States, as “these cases”). 
North Carolina’s proposal similarly read: “[T]he judicial power of the United States shall
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Despite spinning many ingenious horror stories, no antifederalist
suggested that jurisdiction would turn on the identity of a vaguely
defined class of persons other than the parties to the suit. In the
most extended antifederalist treatment of the Heads of Jurisdiction,
Brutus assumes that the citizenship inquiry under the Diversity
Clause will turn on the citizenship of persons who are parties “in a
suit” through formal “process,” and pitches his opposition to the
Clause based on fears that courts would devise “fictions” governing
the citizenship of parties.220
The Heads of Jurisdiction were the subject of the most exten-
sive ratification debates in the Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North
Carolina ratifying conventions. Yet, despite 228 uses of “case,” and
50 uses of “controversy” during discussions of the judiciary
articles,221 I have found no instance in which a speaker defines the
words to extend to prelitigative questions or disputes. To the
contrary, “suit” is the meaning of every unambiguous use of the
words—by James Wilson in Pennsylvania’s ratification debates, who
referred to parties to controversies with the United States as
“suiters”; James Iredell in North Carolina’s; and George Mason,
John Marshall, and John Madison in Virginia’s, who interchange-
ably used the words “cases,” “controversies,” and “suits” as syn-
onyms.222
extend to no case where the cause of action shall have originated before the ratification of this
Constitution, except in disputes between states about their territory, disputes between
persons claiming lands under the grants of different states, and suits for debts due to the
United States.” 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 218, at 246.
220. His comments, in turn, clearly equate “parties” to Article III controversies with parties
to suits, and therefore use “controversy” to mean lawsuit, not disputes that precede a lawsuit.
Essays of Brutus XII, Feb. 14, 1788, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 426-27 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981); see also id. at 246 (“Nothing more is necessary than to set forth, in the
process, that the party who brings the suit is a citizen of a different state from the one against
whom the suit is brought.”).
221. The tally is based on the search for the terms “case,” “cases,” “controversy,” and
“controversies” in the records of ratification debates in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North
Carolina reprinted in Elliot’s Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution. I did not count generic uses of “case” or “controversy” in contexts
unrelated to litigation or the text of Article III.
222. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 218, at 490 (remarks of James Wilson) (observing that
parties in “controversies” with the United States are “suiters”); 4 id. at 145 (remarks of James
Iredell) (interchangeably referring to “suits” and “cases” as settings for jury trial—that is, a
lawsuit); 3 id. at 557 (remarks of John Marshall) (referring to a “controversy” between a state
and foreign state as “such a suit”); id. at 523 (remarks of George Mason) (referring to
“controversies” between citizens claiming land grants under different states as “suits”;
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Indeed, in every instance in which members of every state
ratifying convention specified the procedural status of citizens of
different states under the Diversity Clause or others “between”
whom a controversy must subsist (aliens, states, and foreign states),
they identified these persons or entities as “parties” to either “suits”
or “actions,” and never once referred to them as persons interested
in the underlying questions litigated.223
Of course, because no one rejected a broader meaning of the
terms, none of the evidence definitively excludes the possibility that
the Framers understood that the words “case” and “controversy”
might encompass prelitigative disputes for purposes of establishing
subject matter jurisdiction. The important point is that the Framers
and ratifiers pervasively explained the terms case and controversy
at a narrow level of generality to refer to duly instituted suits or
namely, absent the grant of jurisdiction over such a controversy, “the suit must be brought
and decided in one or the other state, under whose grant the lands are claimed, which would
be injurious, as the decision must be consistent with the grant”); id. at 527 (remarks of George
Mason) (interpreting the clause extending jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies between a state,
or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects” to refer to “suit[s] between [a
state] and a foreign state”); 4 id. at 428 (remarks of James Madison) (noting the Constitution
grants federal courts jurisdiction over “suits between citizen and citizen”).
James Madison not only insisted that federal jurisdiction was confined to “suits,” but
invoked the law of proper parties, which regulated litigants’ capacity to sue, to explain why
states would not be “made parties” to a lawsuit in federal court without their consent. 3 id.
at 532-33 (stating under the law of proper parties, diversity jurisdiction “will not go beyond
the cases where [citizens] may be parties. A femme covert [that is, a married woman] may be
a citizen of another state, but cannot be a party in this court”); id. at 533 (“A subject of a
foreign power ... may carry [a state] to the federal court; but an alien enemy cannot bring suit
at all.”); id. (explaining that because under the law of proper parties, states cannot be made
parties without their consent, grants of jurisdiction over controversies “between” states and
citizens of other states also “can have no operation” unless “a state should condescend to be
a party”). Because the proper parties requirement arose only in the context of litigation,
Madison, here, treats Article III as a grant of jurisdiction over various kinds of suits between
litigant parties, rather than a grant of jurisdiction premised on the interests that persons
outside court may have in the litigated question.
223. See, e.g., 1 id. at 323 (Massachusetts ratifying convention) (proposing alteration that
would read: “In civil actions between citizens of different states, every issue of fact, arising
in actions at common law, shall be tried by a jury, if the parties, or either of them, request it”);
id. at 326 (New Hampshire ratifying convention) (same); 2 id. at 132 (noting that a jury trial
should be allowed “in civil actions between citizens of different states, if either of the parties
shall request it”); id. at 491 (Pennsylvania ratifying convention) (remarks of James Wilson)
(noting that, although the Diversity Clause allows parties to file suits against citizens of
different states in federal court, it does not prevent “the parties [from] commenc[ing] suits in
the courts of the several states”); 4 id. at 163 (stating that federal jurisdiction lies where
“parties” claim under land grants from different states).
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related legal proceedings, rather than the abstract questions that
precede a lawsuit. The unrelenting specificity with which the
Framers explained the terms correlates with the inferences of the
text; both terms are used at a narrow level of specificity—to mean
“suits”—and are not flexible enough to mean disputes for purposes
of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.
C. Reconstituting the Diversity Clause
Hamilton’s claim that Article III’s party-based Heads of
Jurisdiction turn on the identity of parties interested in the
questions that precede a suit accordingly finds no direct supporting
evidence in text, drafting history, or preratification interpretations
of Article III. Rather, that evidence uniformly points the other way:
Article III “cases” and “controversies” are terms of art that refer to
suits. As we have seen, “suits” subsisted only “between” persons who
were “before the court” and capable of being bound in some
sense—that is, in conventional eighteenth-century parlance,
“parties to the suit.”
The upshot is that Marshall had the big picture right, but his
narrow construction of the term “party” in Osborn was not required
as a matter of original meaning.224 Article III’s party-centered Heads
of Jurisdiction, interpreted for all they are worth, turn on the
identity of those who meet prerequisites to be bound in some sense,
a category broader than the parties named as such in the case
caption of a federal complaint. 
To be sure, while the intratextual evidence is strongly suggestive
and the historical evidence of meaning one-sided, that evidence is
also circumstantial. There is no smoking gun that proves, to a
historical certainty, that the framing generation would have
accepted the understanding of the Diversity Clause advanced above.
For original meaning originalists, however, that’s not a problem:
originalism’s goal is determining the objective—that is, the “most
likely”—meaning of the text, a burden of proof that is either
explicitly adopted by, or implicit in, all conventional applications of
“original meaning” originalism.225 Readers can judge for themselves
224. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819, 850-58 (1824).
225. Barnett, supra note 7, at 620.
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whether the evidence presented above rises to, say, the level of
“clear and convincing”; but the claim here is that the evidence
available to us isn’t even arguably in equipoise between Hamilton’s
and Marshall’s interpretations. One can reject the interpretation
advanced above only at the price of dismissing reliance on the “more
likely than not” standard of proof that underpins other conventional
applications—to, say, the Second Amendment or the Commerce
Clause—of the originalist project.
So understood, the concept of the jurisdictional party imposes
outside limits on Congress’s power to define the scope of diversity
jurisdiction. That is, Congress can’t authorize courts to exercise
jurisdiction on a minimum diversity theory based on the citizenship
of persons courts cannot bind.226 To be sure, under the horizontal
portion of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has wide
power to prescribe laws “necessary and proper to carry into Execu-
tion” the judicial power, including laws prescribing “whether and
how the [federal courts] can [hale]” people before them.227 And,
under the current understanding of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, Congress also has the power to control the res judicata
effect of federal judgments, subject to the dictates of due process.228
But Congress cannot rewrite the meaning of the party concept as
a term of jurisdictional limitation. Because, said Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland, the Necessary and Proper Clause limits
Congress to actions within “the letter and spirit of the constitu-
tion,”229 Congress must take the terms governing the conditions of
execution of judicial power as it finds them. And because Article
III’s text, understood in light of its original meaning, hinges
diversity jurisdiction on the identity of persons who can be bound,
Congress cannot pin minimum diversity230 on the citizenship of
226. Because jurisdiction is tested at the time the suit is filed, a court, moreover, must have
the power to bind persons whose citizenship counts toward diversity jurisdiction at the outset
of the suit. See infra note 231.
227. Nelson, supra note 86, at 1631.
228. Stephen Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal
Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 781 (1986); Patrick Woolley, The
Sources of Federal Preclusion Law after Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 535 (2007).
229. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
230. There may be additional constitutional limits on minimum diversity. It is possible, for
example, that some claims may be so transactionally unrelated that they constitute separate
“suits” under the original meaning of the term, preventing the citizenship of parties in the
diverse “suit” from grounding supplemental jurisdiction over parties to the separate,
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persons that it has not authorized courts to bind at the time
jurisdiction is tested.231
nondiverse “suit.” Cf. C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
613 (2004) (suggesting eighteenth-century principles governing necessary and permissive
joinder should inform scope of a “constitutional case”). But see Matasar, supra note 5 (arguing
scope of permissive joinder is a matter of legislative discretion). I do not investigate that
possibility here. 
This Article also has no valence for debates about the statutory amount-in-controversy
requirement. Congress obviously may, as a statutory matter, impose an amount-in-
controversy limit on diversity jurisdiction and nothing in this Article prevents Congress from
allowing diverse claimants to satisfy that statutory limit by aggregating the anticipated value
of absent class members’ claims. The original meaning of the Diversity Clause requires only
that the court’s original jurisdiction depend on the citizenship of persons within the court’s
power to bind at the time jurisdiction is tested.
231. Diversity jurisdiction is tested by party configuration at the time of filing. Anderson
v. Watts, 138 U.S. 694 (1891). The original meaning of the Diversity Clause does not address
how a plaintiff or removing defendant may demonstrate that the prerequisites for issuance
of binding judgments have been met as a jurisdictional matter at the time of filing; that is a
matter for construction. The modern approach requires a full blown investigation into
constitutionally required jurisdictional facts, such as the parties’ citizenship, under the usual
burden of proof applicable at trial. See, e.g., Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism,
93 VA. L. REV. 1829 (2007). But, a lesser prima facie showing of contested jurisdictional facts
that intertwine with the merits is permitted. See, e.g., Kevin Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact,
91 CORNELL L. REV. 973 (2006) (noting that a prima facie showing is made by presenting some
plausible competent evidence supporting the existence of jurisdictional facts); see also Collins,
supra, at 1838-39 (noting pervasive early nineteenth-century practice of allowing pleadings,
absent objection, to establish jurisdictional facts). 
Although questions of proof of jurisdictional party status are beyond the scope of this
Article, it would fall within the range of acceptable liquidations to allow certification of service
to presumptively establish a named defendant as a jurisdictional party, while allowing a
defendant to overcome that presumption by showing that she has not received proper notice.
In representative contexts, a lesser prima facie showing might establish contested facts
intertwined with the merits, such as facts relating to adequacy of representation. Of course,
some jurisdictional facts will not be present under any standard of proof. For example, the
provision of required notice to putative class members and the completion of the opt out
period, which is required to make Rule 23(b)(3) class members parties for purposes of
preclusion under most standard accounts of preclusion in the class context, see infra notes
261-62 and accompanying text, are plainly not in being at the outset of a putative class action. 
For reasons suggested in the next Section, courts should treat completion of the certification
process at the trial level as a prerequisite for recognizing absent class members as
jurisdictional parties, absent further direction from Congress. See infra notes 276-86 and
accompanying text. 
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V. THE STRUCTURAL ROLE OF THE DIVERSITY CLAUSE
It is left to show that the original meaning of the Diversity Clause
yields normatively satisfying results in concrete cases.232 In Sections
A and B, I show that enforcing its original meaning serves two
structural principles: federalism, by protecting states’ sovereignty
over litigation in their courts; and separation of powers, by reinforc-
ing a role for Congress in defining the proper scope of res judicata
at the federal level.
I conclude, in Section C, with an illustration of the ways that
enforcing the original meaning of the Diversity Clause serves these
values, with a focus on the implications of its original meaning for
the scope of diversity jurisdiction in the class action context. 
A. Liberty Interests as a Federalism Safeguard
Among skeptics of the new Constitution, the party-based Heads
of Jurisdiction were viewed as, in George Mason’s words, “unneces-
sary[ ] and dangerous.”233 Federalists, in turn, were lukewarm about
the provision.234
Opponents of the Diversity Clause pitched their concerns in terms
of federalism, but in an antiquated sense that most advocates of
federalism do not embrace today. Today, federalism is typically
defended either in terms of “competitive federalism”—the idea that
decentralization promotes competition for law among different legal
regimes235—or in terms of Justice Brandeis’s “laboratory of the
states” idea, which views federalism as a mechanism for testing out
ideas at a local level before they are tried nationally.236
Opponents of the Diversity Clause were concerned about federal-
ism in an older “states’ rights” sense: they sought to preserve the
232. Amar, supra note 12, at 801 (stating that a textual analysis must be supplemented by
consideration of whether the reading actually works in action and yields “satisfying” results).
233. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 218, at 527.
234. Id. at 533 (James Madison) (“As to ... cognizance of disputes between citizens of
different states, I will not say it is a matter of much importance. Perhaps it might be left to
the state courts.”).
235. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
236. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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raw power and influence of state courts relative to the new federal
courts and feared that the Diversity Clause would be a wedge for
federal courts to diminish that power.237
The party, as a concept of jurisdictional limitation, was designed
to mollify opponents’ concerns by placing raw limits on the power of
federal courts to draw litigation out of state courts. And given
eighteenth-century rules defining party-status, it did that with a
vengeance, triggering federal jurisdiction only when a cross-border
dispute had been reduced to concrete litigation in which identifi-
able litigants of diverse citizenship had been joined to the effect of
a judgment according to long-established, narrow, rules-based
principles.
The party limitation also meshed with the antibias purpose of the
Clause. The risk of bias against out-of-state litigants, of course, was
much more acute in cases where an actual litigant resided out of
state and the other resided in-state. The risk of bias was far more
attenuated when both litigants resided in the same state but some
nameless persons out of court lived out-of-state and had an interest
in the suit.238
Today, courts’ power to bind persons to a judgment has changed,
and with it the balance of power between federal and state courts
under the Diversity Clause. But the Diversity Clause, originally
understood, continues to place some limits on the expansion of
federal jurisdiction vis-à-vis state courts. 
To see how, it is necessary, first, to clarify the terminology of
modern preclusion law. Modern preclusion law distinguishes be-
tween ordinary preclusion—the rules of merger and bar and
collateral estoppel applicable to a named party-plaintiff or party-
defendant—and “non-party preclusion”—the rules governing the
preclusive effect of a judgment on those not named as parties in the
237. See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 532-36
(1998).
238. James Pfander additionally notes that efficiency gains accrue from hinging diversity
on the identity of actual litigants because actual litigants are best situated to assess the
quality of justice in state court. See James E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and
Constitutional Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1925, 1952-53 (2004) (“By making party
identity the test of jurisdiction ... diversity offers a cleaner jurisdictional test” than an
alternative approach to addressing state court bias, which requires an “official inquiry into
problems with the quality of justice in state court”; instead, “diversity simply ... relies upon
the parties themselves to assess state court competence.”).
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litigation. This party/nonparty distinction reflects a change in the
use of the party concept that occurred in the nineteenth century, as
lawyers increasingly limited their use of the term “party” to persons
named in a complaint while defining additional persons bound as
“privies” or “privities.”239
Below, when I refer to persons subject to “non-party” preclusion,
I refer to persons who are not named parties, but who can be bound
by a judgment through a relationship of privity with a named party.
When I refer to “jurisdictional parties” by contrast, I use the term
party in its original Article III sense—meaning all persons who can
be bound by a judgment in the suit.
The Due Process Clause protects a right to a “day in court.”240
“Non-party” preclusion—which allows individuals to be bound even
if they have not literally had a “day in court”—describes a set of
exceptions to that entitlement.241 Each of those exceptions reflects
a determination that due process does not require courts to give a
person an actual “opportunity to be heard” before binding her
interests, because constitutionally adequate safeguards substitute
for that opportunity.242
239. Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1996).
240. Id. at 798-99.
241. Id.
242. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161 (2008),
summarizes the five (actually six—I have condensed it to five) categories of expanded “non-
party” preclusion:
First, those not named as parties in a suit may consent to be bound. For example, parties
in actions arising out of the same transaction may “agree that the question of the defendant’s
liability will be definitely determined, one way or the other, in a ‘test case.’”
Id. at 2172.
Second, persons in a narrow class of “substantive legal relationship[s]” with the named
party in a suit may be bound by judgments against the named party; for example, succeeding
owners of property are bound by in rem judgments against the preceding owner. Id.
Third, persons who “assume control” over litigation, but did not appear as a formal party
to the litigation, may be bound by judgments against the named party. Id. at 2173 (alterations
omitted).
Fourth, a “special statutory scheme”—bankruptcy, for example—may “‘expressly foreclos[e]
successive litigation by nonlitigants, if the scheme is otherwise consistent with due process.’”
Id.
Fifth, persons “adequately represented by someone with the same interests who [was] a
party” to the suit are bound by a judgment against the representative if the representative
relationship was understood by the absentee or if courts have assessed the adequacy of
representation and respected other due process safeguards. Id. at 2172-73.
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Because Article III uses “party” to mean a “person who can be
bound,” absentees who fall within categories of nonparty preclusion
qualify as jurisdictional parties under Article III.243 That means that
Article III allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over a suit
on a minimum diversity theory, even if the named plaintiff and
defendant are nondiverse, if (1) an identifiable absentee has a
relationship with one of the named parties that draws her into any
recognized category of nonparty preclusion, and (2) she lives outside
the state of an adverse named party’s residence at the time the suit
is filed. 
Thus, the contours of nonparty preclusion draw lines around the
interests in a suit that are considered jurisdictional and therefore
draw lines around the range of persons whose citizenship can
ground minimum diversity. In effect, because the boundaries of
nonparty preclusion are a function of due process, Article III
converts the Due Process Clause into a federalism safeguard. 
This is not as peculiar as it sounds. Personal jurisdiction doctrine
makes much the same use of due process. To protect individuals’
liberty interests in the predictable exercise of states’ power to issue
extraterritorial compulsory process, the Court bars states from
exercising personal jurisdiction over out-of-staters who have not
purposefully directed their conduct toward a state or consented to
a state’s exercise of jurisdiction.244 In World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, the Court, in turn, held that personal jurisdiction doc-
trine “acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”245 However, in Insurance
Corporation of Ireland v. Compaigne Des Bauxites De Guinee, the
Court emphasized that the due process restraints on personal juris-
diction protect state sovereignty by protecting individual liberty
interests.246 “[T]he requirement of personal jurisdiction, as applied
to state courts,” the Court agreed in Bauxites, “reflects an element
of federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis-à-vis other
States.”247 But “[t]he restriction on state sovereign power” accom-
243. Id. at 2171-72.
244. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
245. Id. at 291-92.
246. 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982).
247. Id.
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plished by personal jurisdiction doctrine “must be seen as ultimately
a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due
Process Clause.”248 In other words, by protecting individuals’ liberty
interests, personal jurisdiction doctrine protects state sovereignty
by drawing lines around a state’s ability to draw litigation out of
other states. 
Article III and personal jurisdiction doctrine thus make parallel
use of due process as federalism safeguard. Personal jurisdiction
doctrine protects “state sovereignty vis-à-vis other States,” and
Article III protects state sovereignty vis-à-vis the federal govern-
ment, as “a function of [an] individual liberty interest preserved by
the Due Process Clause.”249 The difference is that the liberty interest
relevant to Article III is the interest protected by due process
standards governing the scope of nonparty preclusion, while the
liberty interest relevant in the personal jurisdiction cases is the
interest protected by due process standards governing the extrater-
ritorial reach of compulsory process.250
Of course, those who drafted the Constitution may not have
anticipated the Diversity Clause and the Due Process Clause would
interact in quite this way; they may have assumed the rules for
joining someone to the effect of a judgment were fixed and unchang-
ing and therefore never anticipated that the Due Process Clause
would have a role to play in setting limits around who could be
bound or diversity jurisdiction. The meaning of a text, however, is
different from expectations about its application. Here, as original
expectations about the application of the Diversity Clause have
become outmoded, a deeper structure lurking just beneath its
surface comes to the fore.
 Considered at a pure normative level, the deeper structure of the
Diversity Clause may not attract passionate adherents today, as no
one ascribes normative value to state sovereignty in the way that
many in the eighteenth century did. Even so, the Diversity Clause
reflects a compromise, essential to the Constitution’s passage, with
people who took that vision of state sovereignty seriously.251
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. WOOD, supra note 237, at 529 (explaining that Federalists were forced to concede that
the “problem of sovereignty,” meaning the concern that the Constitution would be driven to
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B. The Diversity Clause and Separation of Powers
Recovering the original meaning of the Diversity Clause enhances
another secondary structural feature of the Constitution: separation
of powers. It does so by providing an explicit textual basis for
Congress’s role in defining the preclusive reach of federal judg-
ments. Article III’s grants of jurisdiction are, of course, not self-
executing. Because Congress must therefore define the scope of
diversity jurisdiction federal courts can exercise, and because the
permissible scope of diversity jurisdiction depends on the extent of
federal courts’ power to preclude, Congress will often be forced to
make decisions about the proper scope of preclusion when defining
the persons whose citizenship counts toward diversity jurisdic-
tion.252
By contrast, under the current understanding of the Diversity
Clause, Congress is under no obligation to deliberate about the
scope of nonparty preclusion when it decides to expand the scope of
federal diversity jurisdiction. Predictably, Congress has generally
ceded this territory to the common lawmaking powers of federal
courts.253
Enforcing the original meaning of the Diversity Clause therefore
has a modest but important democracy-forcing effect on the
evolution of the law of preclusion. As Congress expands the universe
of persons whose citizenship counts in the diversity calculus, it
makes decisions about nonparty preclusion in the federal system. 
consolidate power at the expense of states, “was the most powerful obstacle to the acceptance
of the new Constitution the opponents could have erected”). 
252. Of course, under Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497
(2001), state rules of preclusion generally govern the preclusive effect of federal judgments
in diversity cases as a matter of federal common law. Id. at 508. However, in some cases,
including in the class context, uniform federal rules control because “state law is incompatible
with federal interests” in uniformity. Id. at 509; In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 333 F.3d
763, 767-68 (7th Cir. 2003) (Easterbrook, J.) (stating that Semtek’s proviso overcoming default
application of state preclusion rules is applicable to class certification and other class
judgments). In such cases, if Congress wants to treat persons outside the scope of federal
preclusion principles as jurisdictional parties, it must displace the uniform federal common
law rule. 
253. A few exceptions prove the rule. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(n) (2006) (precluding attacks on “an employment practice that implements ... a litigated or
consent judgment” by those who had actual notice, a reasonable opportunity to present
objections, and were adequately represented).
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Of course, due process imposes an outer limit on the scope of
nonparty preclusion. But, even here, Congress has a role to play.
Modern due process doctrine is dynamic, rather than static. And
while changes in that doctrine are court-driven, Congress is not
irrelevant. At a minimum, Congress can try to influence the
evolution of due process principles by staking out positions on the
proper scope of courts’ power to issue preclusive judgments in areas
where the scope of that power is unsettled. Some argue that
Congress can even overrule many of the Court’s due process
precedents in the preclusion arena, on the theory that those rules
are a species of default “constitutional common law” that can be
displaced by Congress.254 Even if you reject this somewhat radical
claim—which the current Supreme Court does not appear to
accept255—federal courts can certainly take the views of the political
branches into account when deciding what due process requires.
Many nonoriginalists will quickly agree that the views of the
political branches are relevant to liquidation of constitutional
meaning.256 What is less appreciated is that many, probably most,
current originalists agree with this view to some degree, particu-
larly when it comes to liquidating what due process requires. The
content of the Due Process Clause is vague and indeterminate.
Liquidating what that Clause means is accordingly a quintessential
example of constitutional construction. A significant proportion—
probably the dominant portion—of originalists agree that the
constitutional constructions of federal courts should, at a minimum,
consider, if not always defer to, the views of the political branches.
As Keith Whittington argues, while constructions must “on occa-
sion” be made by judges, those constructions are necessarily shaped
254. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1975) (stating that the “ever lengthening line” of
procedural due process cases “invites analysis” as a species of constitutional common law,
subject to legislative alteration).
255. The Supreme Court recognizes that due process leaves room for jurisdictional
variation in nonparty preclusion subject to a constitutional ceiling, but is coy about which of
its due process flavored preclusion precedents are constitutionally required. See, e.g., Taylor
v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161 (2008) (reaffirming the existence of a constitutional ceiling on
nonparty preclusion, in the course of rejecting a virtual representation theory of preclusion,
while refusing to specify whether its ruling is a matter of federal common law or is
constitutionally required).
256. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS passim
(1999).
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by constitutional interpretations advanced by “political actors in and
around the elected branches of government.”257 Some originalists, of
course, go further, arguing that “[w]hen a constitutional question is
[ambiguous,] ... the tie for many reasons should go to the side of
deference to democratic processes.”258
Either group would agree that federal courts should consider
Congress’s views about what due process requires when deciding
who may be bound by a judgment. Enforcing the original meaning
of the Diversity Clause, in turn, will increase the odds that federal
courts will have the benefit of Congress’s views on that question.
When Congress considers treating persons who are not clearly
proper objects of courts’ preclusive power as jurisdictional parties,
it is forced to deliberate about whether those persons should and
could be subject to the preclusive effect of federal judgments,
because only an affirmative answer on that score would allow
Congress to treat those persons as jurisdictional parties. And when
it answers affirmatively, Congress’s jurisdictional enactment pro-
vides federal courts with information about the political branches’
views of the constitutional boundaries on nonparty preclusion. 
C. Implications of Enforcing the Original Meaning of the Diversity
Clause: The Example of CAFA
Enforcing the original meaning of the Diversity Clause, then,
simultaneously protects federalism and draws Congress into a
dialogue with federal courts over the permissible scope of courts’
preclusive power. The two goals are in some tension: Traditionally,
federal courts have been reluctant to expand the scope of nonparty
preclusion.259 Yet the more the political branches are involved in
defining preclusion principles and the more deference federal courts
give to the political branches’ views on unsettled questions of
preclusion, the less sanguine we can be that the law of preclusion
will be a stable line in the sand against aggrandizement of federal
courts at the expense of state courts.
257. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 612 (2004).
258. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortion, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA.
L. REV. 263, 267 (2008).
259. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty
Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 196 (1992) [hereinafter Bone, Nonparty Preclusion].
2009] A NEW LOOK AT THE DIVERSITY CLAUSE 1185
A sensible compromise that respects the importance of both the
federalism and separation of powers features of the Clause would
require Congress to speak clearly about the preclusive effect of
federal judgments before federal courts will consider upholding
jurisdictional grants whose constitutionality depends on an ex-
pansive resolution of unsettled questions of preclusion. As in other
areas of the law, requiring this kind of clear statement from
Congress protects state sovereign interests from federal encroach-
ment by imposing process-based limits on Congress “derived from
both the representation of the states in Congress and the procedural
difficulties of federal lawmaking.”260
The point is illustrated by the Class Action Fairness Act. Whether
CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions are consistent with Article III,
originally understood, depends on unsettled questions about the
scope of preclusion in the class context. Assessing CAFA’s constitu-
tionality, in turn, provides an opportunity for courts to solicit
congressional input about how to resolve those questions. But to
respect the federalism-protecting role of the Diversity Clause,
federal courts must demand that Congress squarely resolve these
questions before upholding the statute.
1. The Questionable Constitutionality of CAFA
According to a widely held understanding of Phillips Petroleum
v. Shutts,261 absent class members in a Rule 23(b)(3) class are, as
matter of due process, categorically beyond the reach of courts’
preclusive power prior to the issuance of notice to the class and
the expiration of the Rule 23 “opt out” period, which occurs
after the trial court has assessed whether the class satisfies Rule
23's commonality, typicality, adequacy, and predominance require-
ments.262
If that’s correct, CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions violate Article
III. Absentees do not qualify as jurisdictional parties prior to
260. Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival
after Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 31-32.
261. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
262. See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 717, 786 (2005) (noting that Shutts is “frequently cited for the proposition that notice
and opt-out rights are a constitutional requirement in a damages class action”).
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certification, and their citizenship cannot ground federal jurisdiction
under a minimum diversity theory. The upshot is that, while the
Diversity Clause does not prevent removal of large aggregations of
claims out of state courts for pretrial discovery and trial, it does, in
cases in which the named plaintiffs and defendants are not diverse,
delay that removal until the certification process is completed by the
state court (making the state’s certification decision, in turn, the
“law of the case”).
That doesn’t doom CAFA by any stretch of the imagination.
Defendants could still remove large multistate class actions into
federal court where the named plaintiffs and defendants are
minimally diverse. But it robs CAFA of its greatest promise: to
create a seamless web of jurisdiction over nationwide class
actions.263 While that result does not ruin federal efforts to compre-
hensively address abusive state-level class actions, it would force
Congress to cast in new directions for a comprehensive fix.264
However, an alternative view claims that notice and opt out are
not necessarily prerequisites to federal courts’ power to bind absent
Rule 23(b)(3) class members. If that is correct, CAFA might survive.
This view finds some significant support in the Court’s opinion in
Shutts itself. There, plaintiffs, owners of royalty rights from natural
gas leases to Philips Petroleum, filed a class action in Kansas state
court seeking interest due on royalty payments that Philips had
withheld from the class. The defendant objected that Kansas lacked
personal jurisdiction over the class members, the majority of
whom resided outside Kansas, under the due process framework of
263. By authorizing original and removal jurisdiction whenever class members are diverse,
even if the named plaintiffs are not diverse, CAFA conferred two benefits on defendants:
First, it prevented plaintiffs’ lawyers from evading federal jurisdiction by suing on behalf of
nondiverse named plaintiffs, thereby allowing federal courts to exercise jurisdiction in any
class action with national sweep. Second, it prevented plaintiffs’ lawyers from subjecting
defendants to simultaneous federal and state class actions with national reach. Through
simultaneous federal-state litigation, plaintiffs increase pressure on the defendants to settle
by inflating the defendants’ cost of defending against the underlying claims. By ensuring that
diversity jurisdiction arises whenever putative class members are diverse, CAFA denied
plaintiffs the ability to execute this strategy by suing the defendant in state court on behalf
of nondiverse named plaintiffs. Enforcing the original meaning of the jurisdictional party
would, in turn, gut the features of CAFA that made these payoffs possible, transforming
CAFA from a comprehensive jurisdictional solution to class action abuse to a porous, and
incomplete, solution.
264. See infra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
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International Shoe because “Kansas had no prelitigation contact
with many of the plaintiffs and leases involved.”265 Absent such
contacts, defendants argued, Kansas could exercise personal
jurisdiction over the class only if “out-of-state plaintiffs affirma-
tively consent[ed],” or opted in, “[to] the Kansas courts[’] ... exert[ion
of] jurisdiction over their claims.”266 The Court disagreed that opt in
was required to establish consent, holding instead that constructive
consent was sufficient to ground personal jurisdiction and that such
consent is established when an absent class member is provided
notice of the class action, an opportunity to opt out, and declines
that opportunity.267
As noted earlier, modern personal jurisdiction doctrine is
premised on the view that individuals have a liberty interest in the
predictable issuance of extraterritorial compulsory process.268 Those
who take a narrow view of Shutts accordingly argue that Shutts is
irrelevant when we turn to defining the scope of federal courts’
personal jurisdiction.269 Federal courts “can exercise personal
jurisdiction over parties throughout the territory of the United
States when authorized to do so by rule or statute, whether the
underlying cause of action is based on federal or state law.”270
Because Shutts, in turn, requires notice and opt out as a condition
of exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by states, Shutts has no
direct implication for federal-level litigation.271
Under a narrower reading of Shutts, when a decision does not
involve a direct or concrete determination of class members’ right to
265. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 806.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 812.
268. See supra notes 244-50 and accompanying text.
269. Wolff, supra note 56, at 2093 (describing this view); accord Henry Paul Monaghan,
Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 1148 (1998).
270. Wolff, supra note 56, at 2093.
271. Of course, as Mark Weber notes, the narrow reading of Shutts glosses over the fact
that the Court “stated flatly” that notice and opt out were required to bind class members.
Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 347, 382 (1988). For a nuanced view of Shutts that defends the view that
the case “has broader application in specifying the constitutional limits and requirements for
the procedures employed in representative litigation,” while maintaining that Shutts makes
opt out dispensible for preclusive purposes in some contexts at the federal level, see Wolff,
supra note 56, at 2093.
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relief, procedural due process allows federal courts to bind Rule
23(b)(3) class members without providing them notice or an
opportunity to opt out, so long as they are adequately represented
at the time of judgment.272 A court’s denial of class certification does
not involve the direct adjudication of their right to relief. Therefore,
so long as the class members were adequately represented during
the certification hearing and the order denying certification “leave[s]
open the opportunity to bring statewide class actions,” rather than
national class actions, class members may be bound by the certifica-
tion denial without notice or an opportunity to opt out.273
If the narrow reading of Shutts is correct, CAFA’s treatment of
absent class members as jurisdictional parties could survive, at
least in most applications. Class members qualify as jurisdictional
parties once adequacy of representation is assessed. They are
capable of being bound “in a sense” because they are subject to issue
preclusion if the certification request is denied. Federal courts, in
turn, have “jurisdiction to determine [their] jurisdiction,”274 and
nothing in the federal rules of procedure prevents a federal court
from undertaking an early assessment of adequacy as part of the
removal jurisdiction inquiry.275
Thus, if we accept that Shutts is inapplicable at the federal level,
Article III is susceptible to constructions that could save CAFA’s
treatment of Rule 23(b)(3) absentees’ citizenship from at least a
facial challenge and would also likely save its treatment of absen-
tees’ citizenship in many applications of the statute.
272. Wolff, supra note 56, at 2101-02.
273. Cf. id. at 2102-09 (making a similar argument with respect to the power to bind class
members through antisuit injunctions enforcing denial of certification); id. at 2112 (indicating
analysis of antisuit injunctions against relitigation of a failed certification motion is premised
on a view of the scope of “preclusion” that attaches to “judgments ... that a particular class
configuration should not be certified” under Rule 23(b)(3)). Under this view, if a class is
certified, notice and opt out may be required to reach a final judgment on class members’
ultimate right to relief. Id. at 2102, 2106-07.
274. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 291, 359 (1947).
275. Congress might, for reasons suggested earlier, also permit a lesser showing of
adequacy for jurisdictional purposes than for purposes of certification. See supra notes 252-53;
see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168 (1997) (allowing standing to be assessed on a
motion to dismiss by taking the facts alleged as true). As I suggest in the next Subsection, any
such alteration in evidentiary standards applicable to jurisdictional facts should be made by
Congress, not courts. See infra Part V.C.2. 
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2. Rectifying the Federalism and Separation of Powers     
Problems with CAFA
Resolving uncertainty about Shutts, and CAFA’s constitutionality,
requires a clear statement rule: that is, before upholding CAFA,
courts must demand that Congress clearly state that federal courts
can bind adequately represented absent class members to a
certification denial without notice and opt out.276
Applying a clear statement rule captures both the federalism and
separation of powers benefits of the Diversity Clause, as originally
understood. First, expanding federal jurisdiction will always be
politically more costly when consensus must be reached, not only on
the scope of federal jurisdiction vis-à-vis state courts, but also on the
scope of federal courts’ coercive power over individuals. As a result,
requiring Congress to deliberate about the scope of nonparty pre-
clusion in the class context imposes process-based political hedges
against expansion of minimum diversity at the expense of states. 
Indeed it is not clear whether Congress would have passed CAFA
in its present form if CAFA’s treatment of the citizenship of absent
class members depended on recognition that those class members
could be bound against their interests without notice or an opportu-
nity to opt out. Many libertarian-leaning conservatives, including
some prominent members of the Congress that enacted CAFA,
favored moving to an opt-in regime in which class members must
affirmatively consent to representation before they can be subject to
the preclusive effect of a judgment.277 On the other side, corporate
defendants tend to favor restricting the autonomy rights of class
members, because settling classes in which class members have no
exit rights allows defendants to buy out claims wholesale from the
276. This approach is consistent with the Court’s use of clear statement rules to give teeth
to process-based political restraints on Congress’s power in other contexts including, for
example, the Commerce Clause. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991). 
277. For example, in the years preceding CAFA’s passage, then Rep. Christopher Cox
circulated a draft bill (tentatively entitled “The Right to Choose Your Lawyer Act”) that would
have changed federal rules governing damages class actions to require absent class members
to opt in, rather than opt out, in order to be bound by a class judgment. See Peter Brennan,
Cox Pushing Class Action Legal Reform, ORANGE COUNTY BUS. J., July 17, 2000, at 3. The
proposal was endorsed, in turn, by the libertarian Cato Institute. See, e.g., Michael I. Krauss,
Tort Reform, in CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 107TH
CONGRESS 357 (Edward H. Crane & David Boaz eds., 2001).
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litigation market, achieving peace.278 In a world in which the
Supreme Court enforced the original meaning of the Diversity
Clause, accordingly, one might expect to see libertarian-oriented
conservatives split with business-oriented conservatives over a
proposal that treats absent class members as jurisdictional parties,
given the implications for the preservation of exit rights in the class
context. 
Second, when the political branches reach a consensus favoring
courts’ power to bind class members who have not had an opportu-
nity to opt out, courts have a far more powerful democratic warrant
to expand the scope of nonparty preclusion over those persons. As
a result, enforcing the original meaning of the Diversity Clause
opens a dialogue between Congress and federal courts about the
outer reach of the power to bind in the class context. 
From the standpoint of federalism and separation of powers,
those results compare favorably to our world, in which the original
meaning of the Diversity Clause is unenforced. In our world, of
course, the Congress that passed CAFA didn’t face the political
restraints that enforcing the original meaning of the Diversity
Clause would impose.279 Moreover, post-CAFA, uncertainty about
the meaning of Shutts, and the relation between notice, opt out, and
preclusion in the class context, will probably be resolved without
any direct input by Congress. 
The latter risk is evident in the wake of CAFA’s passage. CAFA
has worked a “dramatic change in the allocation of class actions
within the dual American court system.”280 And commentators, in
turn, have treated CAFA’s enactment as though it has implicitly
“giv[en] voice to regulatory policies” favoring “class actions—and, in
particular, the federal forum—in promoting the fair and efficient
resolution of claims.”281 In light of this penumbral “policy,” a host of
278. Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlements: The Godfather Guide to
Opt Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 147-48 (noting that defendants have incentives
to deter opt outs, in order to buy peace from future litigation through a comprehensive class
settlement).
279. Congress did not consider whether the gains from expanding diversity jurisdiction are
worth curtailing absent Rule 23(b)(3) class members’ rights to notice and opportunity to opt
out. As discussed, the design of the Diversity Clause makes that liberty interest a proxy for
states’ sovereignty interests. See supra Part V.A.
280. Wolff, supra note 56, at 2036-37.
281. Id. at 2038, 2133.
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major proceduralists argue CAFA invites judicial readjustments,
sometimes radical, to the conventions that frame and regulate
federal judicial power because those conventions are not up to the
task of furthering “fair” and “efficient” claim resolution.282 CAFA, it
has been argued, favors overruling Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electrical,
which holds that federal courts must follow the choice-of-law rules
of the forum state in the class context;283 expanding without further
legislative authorization, antisuit injunctions against state-filed
actions;284 and even rethinking the larger contours of the Erie
doctrine,285 despite the statute’s utter silence on all of these
questions. 
The reaction to CAFA illustrates that major jurisdictional policy
shifts have the power to catalyze the intellectual culture of the
federal legal system, with hard-to-predict implications for the judge-
made rules governing judicial federalism. 
While it is too early to make firm predictions for CAFA’s impact
on principles of res judicata, commentators have also relied on
CAFA’s penumbral “regulatory policies” to revive the argument
that opt out is not always required to bind absent class members
in damages class actions, again despite CAFA’s silence on this
question.286 It is far from clear whether this view will catch on
post-CAFA, but in a decision predating CAFA’s passage, Judge
Easterbrook held that absent class members were precluded from
relitigating certification because the court that denied the class
representative’s certification request determined, in the course of
denying that request, that the class members were adequately
represented.287 Defense counsel will obviously redouble their efforts
to convince courts to follow Easterbrook’s approach in CAFA’s wake,
282. Id. at 2037-38.
283. Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law
After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1861 (2006). 
284. Wolff, supra note 56, at 2046-72.
285. Suzanna Sherry, Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class Actions and National Common
Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138-40 (2008). 
286. Wolff, supra note 56, at 2045, 2109-17 (stating that the tacit “imprimatur” of CAFA
makes it “appropriate to craft a federal rule of preclusion for judgments under CAFA that
attaches preemptive force to the ruling of the federal court that a particular class
configuration should not be certified”).
287. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003).
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and courts may well treat CAFA’s supposed regulatory “vision” as
a thumb on the scale in favor of doing so.
If, as the Shutts revisionists argue, the modern doctrine of
nonparty preclusion ill serves the penumbral “regulatory policies”
that CAFA supposedly reflects, Congress—not courts—should make
the changes. Unfortunately, by separating questions about diversity
jurisdiction from questions about the preclusive effect of judgments
on class members, modern jurisdictional doctrine has allowed
Congress to expand jurisdiction while punting questions about
preclusion in class litigation to unaccountable federal courts. 
Enforcing the original meaning of the jurisdictional party, in turn,
stands this state of affairs on its head: If Congress wants to expand
the range of persons whose citizenship counts toward federal
diversity jurisdiction, it must take a position on courts’ power to
bind those persons’ rights. Jurisdictional policy and preclusive
policy are made hand in hand by Congress.
3. Some Final Objections Considered
A predictable objection goes like this: Federal jurisdiction over
class actions results in real efficiencies by increasing the accuracy
of class judgments and eliminating wasteful duplicative federal-
state litigation. At the same time, litigant autonomy is normatively
valuable. Isn’t it perverse to force Congress to choose between these
two goods? 
At one level, the response is that a trade-off between these goods
is inescapable under a Constitution that protects state sovereignty
through the law of res judicata. To realize limits on federal courts’
jurisdiction, lines had to be drawn. Any line drawing exercise will
involve difficult trade-offs. Using the strength of our commitment to
autonomy rights in the preclusion arena as this line is no less
perverse than making liberty interests against compulsory process
the line that protects states from the extraterritorial reach of other
states. This line also forces courts to make hard trade-offs, between
protecting individual liberty interests and realizing efficiency gains
derived from consolidation of suits in a single state.288
288. True, some originalists believe pragmatic considerations can help differentiate
between different constitutional constructions of an ambiguous text. Solum, supra note 7, at
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Second, the objection slights the fact that Congress can achieve
the same efficiencies achieved by CAFA in other ways. Congress
could use its commerce power to “establish legislative limits on state
courts[’] ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over ... individuals
who have no contacts with the state,” thereby limiting state
jurisdiction over multistate class actions;289 or preempt state law
causes of action between citizens of different states and create a
federal right of action in its place, creating federal question
jurisdiction over class actions in that area;290 or commit matters now
dealt with by state-level class actions to administrative oversight,
giving agencies the power to preempt state law.291 Enforcing the
original meaning of the Diversity Clause does not require a stark
choice between protecting litigant autonomy and realizing the
efficiencies of federal management of class litigation—it requires a
choice between achieving those efficiencies by expanding federal
diversity jurisdiction in a constitutionally permissible way or
achieving those efficiencies through another constitutionally ade-
quate avenue. 
Third, even if enforcing the original meaning of the Diversity
Clause will often force difficult trade-offs between efficiency and
autonomy, enforcing the original meaning of the Diversity Clause
does not require senseless trade-offs. Indeed, in many cases ex-
panding jurisdiction and curtailing litigant autonomy will make
good sense. In a hypothetical world in which courts enforce the
original meaning of the jurisdictional party, Congress will expand
minimum diversity only in cases where Congress believes the
anticipated value of federal management is significant enough to
outweigh the normative cost of curtailing the “day in court”
entitlement.292 If, in turn, expanding federal control over multistate
76. But the evidence presented below underscores that the link between preclusion and the
scope of diversity is required by the Diversity Clause. These trade-offs are simply inescapable
if we enforce its original meaning. 
289. Pfander, Limits, supra note 58, at 1468.
290. Richard A. Epstein, Federal Preemption, and Federal Common Law in Nuisance
Actions, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 551 (2008).
291. See Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative
State, 1 J. TORT L. (2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/jt/vol1/iss1/at4. For those who
take a narrow view of Congress’s commerce power, I’ve sketched a more creative route to
reform. See, e.g., Mark Moller, The Rule of Law Problem: Unconstitutional Class Actions and
Options for Reform, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 855 (2005).
292. People value the “day in court” entitlement for different reasons, including for both
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class actions results in significant gains in accuracy and cost-
savings, those gains will usually swamp any gains that might come
from permitting prior judgments to be relitigated by absentees:
The accuracy benefits of relitigating judgments usually “decline[ ]
sharply and rapidly approach[ ] zero as the number of lawsuits
[seeking to relitigate prior judgments] increases.”293 In the class
context, for example, if the value of federal management of class
litigation is so great, it will make sense for federal courts to preclude
absent class members from relitigating a failed class certification
bid in another forum. 
Finally, refusing to enforce the original meaning of the Diversity
Clause doesn’t eliminate the need to resolve difficult trade-offs
between efficiency and autonomy in the class context. If the original
meaning of the Diversity Clause remains unenforced, CAFA will
remain on the books as is. And if the efficiency gains promised by
CAFA are real, courts post-CAFA have powerful incentives to adjust
preclusion doctrine in a way that will allow them to protect the
value of their judgments. If, for example, federal management of
multistate class actions is indeed as valuable as Congress presumes,
courts have powerful incentives to adjust preclusion doctrine in
ways that will allow them to preclude absent class members from
collaterally attacking federal judgments about the amenability of
their claims to class treatment. Yet because Congress expanded
jurisdiction but punted on preclusion, courts are likely to do so
unilaterally, without clear direction from the political branches.
A refusal to enforce the original meaning of the Diversity Clause,
then, won’t insulate the law of nonparty preclusion from the push
efficiency and autonomy. Bone, Nonparty Preclusion, supra note 259, at 237-79 (considering
normative justifications for nonparty preclusion). Most people—including most members of
Congress—are likely to value it for both autonomy and efficiency reasons. In addition,
when—as with the opt out rule—there is a case to be made that a particular form of the
entitlement is constitutionally required, some members of Congress will also believe that
curtailing the right entails additional harms to the rule of law and separation of powers. As
a result, Congress, as a body, is likely to rate the day in court entitlement more highly than
it is worth from a pure efficiency standpoint. 
293. Id. at 246. Of course, as Bone notes, the efficiency of nonparty preclusion will vary
depending on the asymmetry of stakes between parties in the first suit. Id. at 251-56. The
point, here, is not that nonparty preclusion is always cost-justified, but that enforcing the
original meaning of the Diversity Clause will rarely result in conjoined expansions of
jurisdiction/curtailment of the day in court entitlement when the latter decision is unjustified
from an efficiency standpoint.
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and pull of class litigation. A refusal to enforce the original meaning
of the Diversity Clause will ensure only this: If autonomy rights in
class litigation are curtailed at the federal level, the choice will be
made by unelected federal judges, acting outside the control of the
political branches. 
CONCLUSION
This Article started with a puzzle created by a relatively obscure
portion of the Class Action Fairness Act and ends with the rediscov-
ery of a forgotten limit on Article III: The outer reach of diversity
jurisdiction is cabined by the scope of federal courts’ power to issue
preclusive judgments. 
Discovering that limit revealed that, much like personal jurisdic-
tion doctrine, Article III protects state sovereignty as “a function of
[an] individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause.”294 Rediscovering the meaning of the Diversity Clause,
accordingly, helps restore some symmetry to our understanding of
the role due process plays in limiting state courts’ power vis-à-vis
those of other states, and federal courts’ power vis-à-vis state courts. 
Recapturing the original meaning of the Diversity Clause also
revealed that the Clause has a democracy-reinforcing effect.
Because diversity jurisdiction is intertwined with the scope of
courts’ preclusive power, enforcing the original meaning of the
Clause can force Congress to deliberate about, and resolve, unset-
tled questions about the scope of nonparty preclusion as an incident
to expanding diversity jurisdiction. 
Finally, our investigation of CAFA’s constitutionality suggested
that a clear statement rule will help capture both the federalism
and democracy-reinforcement benefits of the Clause. That is, federal
courts must demand that Congress speak clearly about the preclu-
sive effect of federal judgments before exercising diversity jurisdic-
tion based on the citizenship of persons, like members of an
uncertified Rule 23(b)(3) class, who fall outside the recognized
boundaries of courts’ preclusive power. As we have seen, requiring
such a clear statement checks the expansion of diversity jurisdiction
294. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compaigne Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10
(1982).
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at the expense of states, while helping to ensure that changes in the
scope of federal preclusion occur through the democratic process in
response to real national needs. Together, both results vindicate the
Diversity Clause’s intended role in our system of federalism and
separated powers.
We hardly knew the seemingly humble Diversity Clause. It is, as
it turns out, worth knowing better. 
